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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS IN AFRICA, A CASE OF SOMALIA

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to highlight the role of international agencies in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Somalia. The paper examines different peacekeeping missions in Somalia, focusing on the ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Depending on the interpretation of realism theory on peacekeeping operations, the researcher will try to find the motives of states involved in the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. In this paper, the concept of national interest is analyzed through the lens of realist theory to understand the motivations of states participating in AMISOM. Also, the researcher attempts to examine the challenges confronting AMISOM. The study used a qualitative approach and attempted to include the exploratory, descriptive, and interpretive elements of the research process. The findings and recommendations of this study will be useful to the leadership of the Somali government and regional and international actors involved in the peace-building process in Somalia. The research will be valuable because it will contribute to the study of international conflicts and, more specifically, to the academic studies of peace building and conflict resolution in Somalia.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Conflict, Somalia, AMISOM, UN,

Tezin Adı: Afrika'daki Barışı Koruma ve Çatışma Çözümünde Uluslararası Kurumlarının Rolü, Somali Örneği
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ÖZET

Bu araştırmanın amacı, uluslararası kuruluşların Somali'de barışı koruma ve çatışma çözümündeki rolünü vurgulamaktır. Araştırma ayrıca, Somali'de devam eden Afrika Birliği Misyonuna (AMISOM) odaklanarak Somali'deki farklı barışı koruma misyonlarını da incelemektedir. Araştırmacı, realizm teorisinin barışı koruma operasyonlarına ilişkin yorumuna bağlı olarak, Somali'deki barışı koruma operasyonuna dahil olan devletlerin motifleri bulmaya çalışacaktır. Bu çalışmada AMISOM'a katılan devletlerin motivasyonlarını anlamak için ulusal çıkar kavramı realist teorinin merceğinden analiz edilmektedir. Araştırmacı ayrıca AMISOM'un karşılaştığı zorlukları incelemeye çalışır. Çalışma nitel bir yaklaşım kullandı ve araştırma sürecinin keşfedici, tanımlayıcı ve yorumlayıcı unsurlarını dahil etmeye çalıştı. Bu çalışmanın bulgu ve tavsiyeleri, Somali hükümetinin liderliğine ve Somali'de barış inşası sürecine dahil olan bölgesel ve uluslararası aktörlere faydalı olacaktır. Araştırma, uluslararası çatışmaların incelenmesine ve daha spesifik olarak Somali'de barış inşası ve çatışma çözümüne ilişkin akademik çalışmalara katkıda bulunacağı için değerli olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış koruma, çatışmalar, Somali, AMISOM, Birleşmiş Milletler

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
EAC	East African Community
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LAS	League of Arab States
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURSO	United Nations Missions for the Referendum in Western Sahara
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSC	Peace and Security Council
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNITAF	United Nations Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nation Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistant Group

DEDICATION

This research paper is dedicated to my beloved mother, Mrs. Waris Omar, she is my inspiration.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction

Somalia became an independent state in 1960, after years of colonial rule by Britain and Italy. Adan Abdule Osman becomes the first elected president of Somalia. After losing 1967 election, Osman becomes the first African president to hand power peacefully to his successor. Before the Supreme Revolutionary Council took over control in 1969, Somalia was regarded as an example of successful democracy in Africa due to its peaceful and generally accepted elections (Ewusi & Akwanga, 2010). However, the Siad Barre-led Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, the Supreme Court, and all the political parties (Ismail, 2010).

After twenty years of military rule and dictatorship, Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council was eventually forced out in the early 1990s by a coalition of armed opposition groups. The fall of the Siad Barre regime has left a political vacuum where clans, sub-clans, warlords and even Islamic groups have come to power, fighting for power and resources, leading to endless conflicts. This creates a hostile situation where everyone claims to be legitimate. The opposition forces were unprepared to take over and maintain law and order when the Somali state collapsed. They failed to construct or reestablish government institutions. A civil war began when these opposition factions declared victory against the Barre dictatorship (Abdullahi, 2017).

When the Somali state collapsed in 1991, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the "United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)" on April 24, 1992, under Resolution 751 (1992), to oversee a cease-fire in Mogadishu and give humanitarian aid. Though the mission's original goal was to provide humanitarian assistance, successive UNSC resolutions expanded the mission's scope to include a peacekeeping operation as well as more comprehensive state-building activities. However, the operation failed due to heavy fighting with warlords, and the mission resumed in early March 1995 with the complete withdrawal of UN forces from

Somalia. Somalia was left to its own fate when the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) left in 1995. Afterwards, an overly localized regime simply cannot produce a traditional entity capable of creating sustainable peace and security in the country (Kenneth, 2011).

This thesis will utilize international literature, news sources, and relevant documents to analyze the role of international agencies in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Somalia. Throughout the analysis, the paper will depend on Relist paradigm to understand that regardless of the tremendous effort of different International and Regional organizations, why there is no peace and stability in the country.

1.1 Problem of the study

Somalia has been engaged in decades of brutal warfare since its civil war broke out in 1988. Around fourteen international peace conferences supported by the international community failed to end the problem and rebuild the institutions. Attempts to improve security, primarily through the UN Peacekeeping force, have failed to stabilize the country. Over the past two decades, the conflict has created several political conundrums and security challenges in the Horn of Africa and beyond (Bruton & William, 2014). Since 2007, AMISOM has failed to defeat Al-Shabaab or weaken its ability to launch attacks, resulting in the continuous killing and displacement of civilians in Somalia and beyond. Furthermore, countries intervening in the conflict of Somalia pursue their own national interests, agendas and priorities, thereby undermining the country's peace process (ibid).

Somalia remains in instability to this day, as Al-Shabaab continues to carry out deadly attacks in Somalia and poses a severe threat to the security of the other East African countries. This study aims to look into the involvement of foreign organizations in Somalia's peacebuilding efforts and what has been accomplished and has not.

1.2 Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study are;

To highlight the Role of International Organizations in Peacekeeping and conflict Resolution in Somalia

To know how national interest jeopardize the potential for long term peace and stability in Somalia

1.3 Research Questions

What is the role of International and Regional Organizations in Somalia's peacekeeping and conflict resolutions?

How does the national interest jeopardize the potential for long term stability of Somalia?

1.4 Hypothesis

States participating in African Union Mission in Somalia and international organizations supporting it used as an instrument to foster their national interests. In so doing this has greatly jeopardized the potential for the long-term stability of the country.

1.5 Methodology of the study

For the purpose of the research, the study will utilize both social scientific literature and primary sources. Further, relevant books, articles, journals, reports, policy and strategy papers, news sources and other relevant documents are consulted. More importantly, the study utilizes agreements and protocols relating to the topic.

1.6 Significance of the research

The collapse of the Somali state and the ongoing civil war have not only caused hardship for the Somali people but have also affected the East African region, both as a threat to regional security and as an obstacle to progress in the region. Despite the fact that Somalia has been demonstrating signs of improvement over the last seven years, the country is still very susceptible and fragile due to the fact that it is in the

process of reconstructing its state institutions with the assistance of the international community.

The study will be a key endeavor in gaining knowledge of the international community's role in the process of peace-building and reconciliation in Somalia. In particular, the study will shed light on the African peacekeeping operation that is currently active in Somalia. The findings and recommendations of this study will be useful to the leadership of the Somali government and regional and international actors involved in the peace-building process in Somalia. This will allow these actors to better understand the impact and significant contribution of their efforts to the peace-building and stability of Somalia. The research will be valuable because it will contribute to the study of international conflicts and, more specifically, to the academic studies of peace building and conflict resolution in Somalia. The researcher has high expectations that this study will serve as a foundation for future studies in this field.

1.7 Organization of the research

This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter one provides the introduction and historical background to the thesis. It points out the statement of research problem, significance of the study. It also sets out the research objectives, questions, hypothesis, the research methodology, and Theoretical Framework. Under this chapter the researcher used Realism theory to conceptualize peacekeeping. Chapter two outlines the review of literature for peacekeeping and conflict resolutions missions. The objective of this chapter is conducting a comprehensive review on the scholarly work on peacekeeping missions and the problem this study attempts to work on. Chapter three highlights the role and effort of different organizations to Somalia's peacebuilding process. In chapter four the researcher writes about the challenges faced by different peacebuilding missions in Somalia, and the analyzation of these missions based on realism theory. Conclusion and Recommendations is the last chapter of this study.

1.8 Theoretical approach

Following the end of the Cold War, attempts to theorize peacekeeping operations have become more common (Barnett, 1995; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010; James, 1990; Pugh, 2003). (Johnstone 2005). In the post-1989 period, three key factors contributed to the peacekeeping literature. The first is the rise in the number of UN and regional organizations-led peacekeeping missions since 1999, second, the release of the Brahimi Report in 2000, and third, the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were seen as turning points in international security and new challenges to the international order. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the way security is analyzed. According to Johnstone (2005), the September 2001 event continues a trend that began a few years before examining peacekeeping in the framework of international politics and international relations theory. As a result, scholarly papers (Paris, 2000; Pugh, 2003) address the necessity to widen the study of peace operations. Paris (2000) advocates for a more theoretical approach to peacekeeping missions. He suggested an urgent need to study peace operations beyond actual operational difficulties and instead look at peace operations as a portal into a realm where more enormous phenomena related to international politics can be studied.

In addition, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004) argue that despite the many writings by different scholars on Peacekeeping operations, the strengths, weaknesses, and experiences of these operations have little or no effort to critique influence of global politics and the role of peacekeeping within it. These scholars attempt to bridge this gap by categorizing perspectives on the practice and theory of peacekeeping (or the responsibility of peacekeeping) into Westphalian and post-Westphalian positions.

To think about peacekeeping in a new way, Williams proposed a method that classified the area into "problem-solving" and "critical" approaches. While these theoretical approaches are essential, "problem solving" theory differs from other theories in that it takes the contemporary world and attempts to find solutions to the problems that arise from it. In contrast, critical theory challenges the dominant international order to reveal the interests it serves and protects, aiming to alter the order to protect the

interests of vulnerable groups (Cox, 1981; Booth, 2007). According to Pugh (2004), a large percentage of the peacekeeping literature tends toward the 'problem-solving' theoretical framework, which he believes is harmful because it limits students' ability to think creatively about the role of peacekeeping in the larger scheme of things. As a result, he proposed a new paradigm for studying peacekeeping: a theoretical approach that examines peacekeeping's conventional wisdom and the global system it serves (Johnstone 2005: 2).

It is essential to think about peace operations theoretically because, according to Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010), ignoring theory from peacekeeping studies will limit our ability to understand the full range of issues in peace operations, from the gendered effects of some peacekeeping practices to the conceptual basis of peace operations. This is because, as these scholars have explained, placing the study of peacekeeping within a theoretical framework helps us comprehend the complex social interactions involved in peacekeeping, which influences what we should study, how we study these phenomena, and, as a result, the conclusions we reach.

Many theoretical frameworks can be used to conceptualize and analyze peacekeeping missions, as a result, in this study, the researcher will rely on a realist theoretical framework to examine the roles and motivations of international agencies in Somalia, specifically the UNs, and EUs funded Peacekeeping operation in Somalia named, African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

1.8.1 Realism Theory

The realist paradigm may be broken down into parts, which include structural neorealism (Waltz 1979), offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001), classical realism (Morgenthau 1973), post-classical realism (Brooks 1979), defensive realism (Synder 1991), and neo-classical realism (Rose 1998). Even while these realists may come up with forecasts and explanations that contradict one another, they do have a similar ground on the issue of the priorities of foreign policy. When responding to international events, states are only led in their actions by calculations that are geared

to further their national interests (Freyberg-Inna 2004). Realism may be utilized in various settings across a wide range of academic fields. In the study of philosophy, the ontological approach is seen as the school of thought that opposes liberalism. In the study of international relations, political realism refers to an analytical framework that emphasizes the notion that every nation acts within the context of a global system characterized by anarchy. The lack of supranational authority is the root cause of the ongoing conflict that exists between countries. States are frequently antagonistic actors competing for their national interest, including survival and security (Walt 1998). This theory is typically regarded as the prominent one in the field of international relations. During the 1930s and 1940s, E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau had a significant amount of sway in the field of international relations. They emphasized the state's infinite power, arguing that the state could and should continually seek to expand its authority. In addition to this, they thought of politics as a rivalry between different states. Since the start of the Second World War, decision-makers and various leaders have adopted a more realistic perspective on the world's politics (Dunne & Schmidt 2005).

According to Ashely (1981), the term "realism" in the area of international relations refers to a set of tenets that include the following: (balance of power, anarchy, self-help, national interest, and security dilemma). International relations take place without a centralized world government, in accordance with the notion of political realists like Hans Morgenthau. This indicates that the international system is anarchical and that the distribution of power among nations is the most important factor to consider when attempting to understand international relations. According to the tenets of realism, an overarching moral standard cannot be applied to the policies of nations (Mongenthau1973). Many realists claim that the state's foreign policy is entirely controlled and guided by realism. Realists make assumptions centered on power politics, which has its roots in international politics. Realists argue that states are the primary actors in international politics and that every state seeks power in order to exist; thus, morality has no role in intentional politics (Gene, 2010). Realists believe that nations are the most significant actors in international politics and that states should prioritize protecting their own national interests (Cozette, 2004). State

sovereignty is absolute, which indicates that the state possesses the ultimate authority to enact laws, which is one of the reasons why realists place a high premium on it (Dunne & Schmidt 2005). Even though realism strongly emphasizes respecting state sovereignty, it does not automatically preclude the possibility of interventions in international politics. The realism perspective on intervention has two elements. Legal and political intervention. In the legal realm, issues like the non-interference principle are taken into consideration. Other nations, regional or international organizations are not authorized to meddle in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, since each state has the ultimate authority to rule and regulate within its borders. If this declaration is not respected, territorial sovereignty is violated. The political category adheres to the realism viewpoint, which maintains that nations should pursue an international strategy that both promotes and defends the nation's interests. An intervention will be carried out when it is determined that the nation's interests are at risk (Hoffman 2006). If a country is not interested in the situation, it will not participate in the intervention and put its soldiers in danger (ibid, 2006).

States do not interfere in a war because they feel compelled to do so on moral grounds; instead, they do so because they stand to gain from the conflict or have important national interests at stake (Glanville 2006). Their legal commitments or moral beliefs do not govern the behavior of states; instead, it is decided by the consideration of their interests and their power. (Morgenthau 1970). The concept of selectively conducting peacekeeping operations is explained by realism, and this selectivity is what governs the decision of governments about whether or not to intervene. If there are benefits to be gained from carrying out an intervention, then state governments will be eager to take part in it (Wheeler and Bellamy 2005). When it comes to promoting their national interests, nations mostly engage in immoral behavior and place a priority on their own self-interests and power (Rory, 2009). The paramount consideration of the country's best interests is a prerequisite that cannot be avoided under any circumstances. Realists of every stripe, then, see the pursuit of national interests and realistic power politics to be an ethical imperative, and they do so in an unambiguous manner (Jack 2005).

The notion of "national interest" influences the school of political realism. When determining a foreign policy's aims or goals, one of the primary analytical tools used is a country's national interests (Ishizuka 2013). The idea of a country's "national interest" has had a tremendous influence on the field of study known as "international relations" due to the environment of international politics. Both academics and professionals agree that a state's actions in the international sphere should be guided primarily by its own national interests (Evans 1989).

When nations have identified their shared national interests, the next step is to formulate their goals. These goals serve as the foundation for state policies, which in turn make it possible for governments to conduct specific actions. To put it another way, if a state consistently prioritizes its own national interests, it has a chance of making progress toward the achievement of its goals (Lerche and Abdul 1979, 28). According to Morgenthau (1970, page 382), interest is at the core of all politics. Because of this, on the world stage, nations are required to seek their national interest, which directs and controls their activities in the politics of the global stage. In addition, Mearsheimer (2001, page 21) suggests that the most important objective of a state should be to achieve a hegemonic position within the framework of the international system. States frequently desire more power and are eager to pursue it if the chance presents itself. Mearsheimer went one step further and stated that states operate in a world of self-help, often behave according to their national interest, and do not sacrifice their national interest for the sake of other states or international society. Mearsheimer's statement was a controversial one at the time. In an analogous manner to this, Carr (1939) argues that rational self-interest is an adequate explanation for international politics and that the concept of global harmony of interest is an unattainable ideal. What can at first glance appear to be an international principle is actually nothing more than the interpretation of a state's national interest at a particular point in time. According to Holton (2009), who cites Waltz, the national interest functions as a signal that directs states how, when, and where to go, and self-interest is the primary orientation for states' activities when it comes to international relations. Jack Donnelly goes so far as to assert that a state's primary commitment is to the national community it represents. As a result, the ethical concerns do not apply, and

major attention should be given to preserving the nation's interest as an unavoidable necessity (Donnely 2005).

According to Geib (2009), governments will only interfere in the crisis of another state if they feel that their national interests, particularly their security interests, are being compromised. In the work of Geogout (2009), the realism perspective defines national interests in terms of military interest, economic interest, and the reputation of a state. This definition is used to explain national interests. The realist believes that nation's stated national interests should take precedence above humanitarianism motivated by altruism. From a realist's point of view, what kind of motivations have encouraged governments to participate in peacekeeping operations? The most important consideration is the status and identity of the nation. According to Han Morgenthau, a policy of prestige is always an important and critical aspect in analyzing the possibility or dangers of a nation's foreign policy; as a result, a policy of prestige is an essential component of national foreign policy (Morgenthau 1993). Charles de Gaulle, operating within the framework of the prevalent realist paradigm of international operations, asserts that governments do not have friends but only interests. To put it another way, the involvement of nations is justified solely by the advantages received by the intervening states, not by the benefits accrued by the host states (Norrie 2014).

Nations' participation in peacekeeping missions may be rationalized using the realist interpretation, which is that governments would do everything in their power to defend and safeguard their national interests (Neack 1995). Given this view, participation in peacekeeping operations is seen to be primarily a tool to increase a state's ability to protect and advance its national interests. In her realist argument, Neck believes that the primary reason governments participate in peacekeeping operations is to showcase their status as regional powers and display their influence. According to the findings of Monnak Gotlan (1996), peacekeeping is an operation driven by self-interest, with the goal of establishing, preserving, or enhancing one's place within the global power structure. In addition, the realism viewpoint provides some concrete reasons for participating in peacekeeping activities. For instance, a state's participation in a particular peacekeeping operation may be a direct consequence of its relationship with

the state that is the beneficiary of the mission. This may be the case when a historical context or a knowledge of enmity between nations is involved. Establishing peacekeeping missions is driven, in part, by the larger governments' vested interest in the region, which is a second reason for this certainty. When the national interests of superpowers or other powerful states are at stake in a war, they provide robust support for peacekeeping operations as part of a global system that is built on the concept of national interests. For example, the United Kingdom has a particular interest in Cyprus due to the island's history as a British colony, which led to the establishment of a peacekeeping operation on the island in the shape of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1974. (Ishizuka 2004).

Simply put, France has done nothing more than defend its national interests and back governments that are loyal to it in their fight against challenges that France views as a danger. France became involved in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the 1980s and 1990s to support governments that it regarded as being pro-French (Macqueen 2006). The motivation behind Australia's intervention in East Timor in 1999 was to play an active role in the region's security and to protect its economic interests within the marine resources between its maritime border and East Timor. This was achieved through a combination of military and diplomatic measures (ibid). In this same context, Ishizuka (2004) suggests that the participation of states in peacekeeping missions is a hype appealing to the international community, for example, my state is doing something good for the world peace, and this permits states to play the role of global policeman. Ishizuka's argument is that the participation of states in peacekeeping mission is a hype appealing to the international community. States are particularly committed to peacekeeping operations because it allows them to expand the size of their armed forces without having to find additional funding from their governments. Instead, funding comes from the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, and other international organizations and countries (Galtung and Hveen 1979). In addition, it is important to acknowledge that superpowers' pursuit of national self-interest in the context of peacekeeping missions has been openly discussed. Former President of the United States Bill Clinton put his signature on Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) on May 4th. This command served the national interest

completely, ensuring that the American peacekeeping strategy would become more cost-effective and selective. According to the summary of the directive, it is stated that "In showing our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or diminish other means for attaining US objectives." "If US participation in peace operations were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, we would place our national interest above all else" (US State Department, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", May 16th 1994).

In conclusion, the realist viewpoint maintains that the frequency with which states contribute to the upkeep of peace relies mainly on the extent to which the national interests of those states are implicated in the conflict. The fact is that involvement in peacekeeping missions is not carried out in accordance with any international law but rather at the discretion of nations, the realist stance derived from the national self-interest can surely be agreed upon. Many people support the realism viewpoint on the peacekeeping operation, and their interpretations on prestige, financing, military grounds, historical backdrop, and the few incidents mentioned above are considered to be quite convincing. Without adopting a realism perspective, states are extremely unlikely to choose to take part in peacekeeping operations or to interfere in armed conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review of peacekeeping and conflict resolutions

The study of peacekeeping operations requires the conceptual comprehension of conflict, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Therefore, this chapter will begin with conceptualization of conflict, conflict resolutions and peacekeeping operation. This chapter also will review the contemporary literature on peacekeeping operations and the theoretical framework of peacekeeping operations.

2.1 Conceptual Understanding of Conflict

Conflict indicates a struggle, whether physical, emotional or verbal. This is the result of a collision between two incompatible opposing forces. It is also possible to interpret it as a condition of nonconformity amongst individuals that has the potential to result in violent behavior (McCandles and Tony 2011). According to Banfield (2005), conflicts arise when two or more groups of people believe that their interests are incompatible with one another, behave belligerently against one another, or take activities that impede the capacity of other groups to pursue their own goals. However, "conflict" is almost frequently used in the same context as "violence," even when the latter is only a technique by which one side or the other resolves a specific dispute. Social and political change can occur due to conflict that does not include violence; nevertheless, when violence does occur, the social and political environment will completely collapse. Coser argues further that conflict is goal-oriented and that when we are engaged in conflict, there is often something that we are trying to bring into existence. According to Tom Woodhouse et al. (2000), conflict is the pursuit by individuals or organizations of goals irreconcilable.

In most cases, conflict arises when individuals or organizations perceive a goal they want to work toward to meet their material requirements, interests, and values. Conflict emerges when established goals give rise to attitudes that run counter to the requirements, priorities, and principles held by other members of the organization to which they belong. This definition of conflict developed by Tom Woodhouse and

colleagues embraces all varieties of conflict, including those between individuals or nations and those that may be resolved by using peaceful means or through the employment of force.

According to Evera (2001, page 13), conflicts arise from an unfair distribution of resources, which can result from an unfair distribution of power in the society, human instinct, and the nature of the internal political and economic system of a polity. Evera makes this assertion in his discussion of the origins of conflicts. According to the findings of research that Collier and Anke (2004) carried out, the factors that contribute to violent acts within a community are as follows: the denial of political rights, high levels of inequality; religious divide; and social isolation. Additionally, they contend that the extortion of natural resources, corruption in public service, and inadequate economic management are the root causes of wars. In addition, Nhema et al. (2008) argument in identifying the causes of conflict in Africa argues that violent conflicts have plagued Africa and have taken a heavy toll on the African societies, economies, and politics robbing them of their democratic possibilities and development potentials. They say this because violent conflicts have plagued Africa and have taken a heavy toll on the African societies, economies, and politics.

Additionally, Nhema and co-authors argue that African wars have numerous origins that may be traced back to colonial brutality. One example is the anticolonial battle, which was violent and lasted for a long time. Anxieties, animosities, aggressions, economic stagnation, and the manipulation and politicization of tribal and ethnic variety by dishonest and corrupt politicians might lead to violence. This results in an increased awareness of the group as a whole and sparks conflict that are aimed against the state and other institutions; these conflicts have the potential to escalate into acts of terrorism and warlords (Nhema et al. 2008). According to Marten (2007), warlordism is a problem that has afflicted many failed and weak nations. Marten also claims that the ruthless and parochial control of warlords deprives states of the possibility of long-lasting peace, security, and economic progress. According to Bulus (2014), conflicts can be categorized as border adjustments, disagreements between neighbors, or internal difficulties. All of these falls under the broad category of internal

problems. The pursuit of different interests, goals, and aspirations by individuals in their attempt to take control of society can give rise to tugs and pulls of conflicting definitions of what is right and fair, which can, in turn, give rise to tugs and pulls of tugs and pulls of conflicting allocation of resources, access to power, and conflicting definitions of what is, right, and fair. In addition, Chikwanha (2012) argues that conflicts in the East African Community (EAC) are primarily a struggle for citizenship rights by factions strongly pursuing non-discriminatory participation in the states' projects. Chikwanha's argument is that conflicts in the EAC are primarily a struggle for the rights of citizens. Chikwanha argues further that disputes in the EAC have been fueled by selfish politics, competition over resources, and poor governance, all of which have created an atmosphere favorable to criminal activity. The conflicts that have arisen in EAC are not caused by a need for the distribution of riches and authority or the consolidation of those powers; instead, they are caused by denying individual wants like recognition, identity, and security.

2.1.1 Conflict Resolution

The purpose of conflict resolution is to end a violent conflict that already exists and to find a solution to it (Bar-Siman 2007). There would be no need for conflict resolution if no conflicts were resolved (Susan 1998, p. 7). To provide a long-term solution to a conflict, conflict resolution requires first determining what caused the conflict in the first place and then being willing to consider the perspectives of all parties involved in the conflict to find a compromise that satisfies everyone's needs. The term "conflict resolution" refers to a variety of practices, including those that help us better understand the factors that lead to conflicts, as well as those that involve working together to lessen physical violence and enhance political systems in order to reconcile and coordinate competing interests (Bercovitch et al. 2009, p 1). Various methods, including adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, mediation, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, are included under the umbrella term "conflict resolution" (ibid).

2.2 Conceptual Understanding of Peacekeeping

The word peacekeeping broadly applies to the deployment of international personnel to stabilize peace and security. In many literatures, "peacekeeping" is described as an effort to terminate or decrease conflicts or avoid hostilities. (Fortna and Howard 2008), however, the concept of peacekeeping in some research is limited to the efforts made to prevent the resumption of hostilities after an official ceasefire has been declared. According to V.P. Fortna (2008), the major goal of peacekeeping during the Cold War was not to forestall the return of war but rather to avert the direct participation of Superpowers in the disputes that occurred between states (for example, in Cyprus). Military troops are required for every peacekeeping operation; however, they could be armed, or they might not be; in addition, many missions also engage civilians in some capacity (ibid).

According to The Blue Berets (2008), peacekeeping is defined as a tactic aimed at sustaining peace after violence has been terminated and assisting in the execution of agreements obtained by peacemakers. Since its inception, the primary military tactic of peacekeeping has been the observation of a ceasefire and the separation of belligerents following an interstate conflict. However, over the years, this strategy has evolved into a more complex one that incorporates several components, including civilian, police, and military personnel, all of whom work together to lay the foundation for a sustainable peace.

The United Nations Charter does not directly allow for peacekeeping operations, despite the fact that peacekeeping missions have become the primary intervention instrument used by the United Nations (UNs) to limit and manage crises. It wasn't until after the UN Charter was created that this practice was improvised; it's been regarded as falling between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Because it goes beyond the customary "Chapter V11 peaceful measures but falls short of Chapter VII collective security activities," the previous Secretary-General of the United Nations, General Dag Hammarskjold, described it as falling between "Chapter 6 and a half" (Kofi 2014). The foundation of UN peacekeeping is the idea that a neutral presence on

the ground may help defuse tension between the warring parties and contribute to the establishment of enduring peace, provided that the parties to a violent conflict have the political will necessary to accomplish this aim. Peacekeeping, which was initially developed as a strategy for controlling and managing interstate conflicts, is increasingly being utilized in intra-state violence and civil wars, which are always characterized by a large number of armed groups with varying political aims and a broken line of command (Handbook on UNs Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 2003). "Peacekeeping is the coordinated presence of military and civilian personnel, and sometimes with police, tasked with various duties including humanitarian aid, protecting human rights, policing, observation of the electoral process and monitoring, as well as economic and social restoration and reestablishment" (Amadi, 2014). When the topic of peacekeeping comes up, one thing that immediately comes to mind is the fact that the missions of the United Nations to maintain peace may either be traditional or multifunctional. Therefore, maintaining peace involves making efforts to restrict or lessen the scope of the conflict. Peacekeeping is something that has long been associated with the United Nations. Still, there are growing disagreements about whether kind of peacekeeping is most appropriate for dealing with violent conflict and what approach should be used to address its political will. According to a member of the Indian Army who served in a peacekeeping assignment and afterwards wrote about their experiences, "regardless of numerous attempts, the meaning of the phrase "peacekeeping" has yet to be agreed upon." As a result of this, the lack of a universal and easily comprehensible meaning of the phrase makes it feasible for various recommendations, such as the one that "it may be utilized as political and, of course, operational goals" (Rikhye, 1984).

2.3 The Emergence of Peacekeeping Operations

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, world leaders were exposed to the extreme destruction that war is capable of wreaking, as well as the invention of mass killing machines; as a result, they came to the conclusion that the world requires an international organization. As a direct consequence of this, the United Nations was established with the goals of preserving global peace, fostering worldwide economic,

social, and cultural collaboration; to strengthen friendly ties between states; to provide a platform where different states can collaborate and respect the goals that were behind the establishment of the United Nations, and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for everyone.

Maintaining peaceful relations among nations is the primary objective of the United Nations. The United States Security Council (UNSC) is an instrument that is tasked with the responsibility of resolving conflicts between nations via the use of peaceful measures such as negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. The organization must have access to armed forces to address issues of this nature from the global arena. Consequently, the goal is for the United Nations to deploy soldiers wherever they are required to do so.

According to MacQueen (2002), the fact that the international system at the time might be described as bipolar explains why it was so challenging to achieve the goal of establishing global security arrangements. The United Nations Security Council was unable to achieve its goal of maintaining peace and stability as a result of the West and the East blocking its efforts. In the early days of the United Nations, the globe was split into two distinct halves; however, this separation presented a dilemma for the UN, particularly for the UN Security Council in carrying out its responsibilities. In a nutshell, the superpowers caused the problem, notably the five veto member nations abusing their right to veto. These governments engaged in such peace initiatives and harmed the core aim of maintaining peace throughout the world.

The United Nations initially stationed military observers in the Middle East in 1948, marking the beginning of the modern practice of peacekeeping (UNPO 2008). In her research, Fortna (2008) differentiates between four different types of peacekeeping operations, categorizing them as either consent-based or non-consent-based. The first three types of peacekeeping operations are consent-based, while the fourth one is classified as Chapter VII missions.

2.3.1 Observation Missions

This involves the deployment of a small number of military personnel and, most of the time, observers from the civilian population oversee a ceasefire, the departure of soldiers, and other kinds of agreement, such as a referendum or election. The members of the military who have been dispatched are not armed, and their primary responsibilities consist of nothing more than monitoring and reporting what they see. Take, for example, the United Nations Missions for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 1991 or the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 11 (UNAVEM) in 1991. Both of these missions occurred in the same year.

2.3.2 Interpositional Mission/Traditional Peacekeeping Mission

This includes deploying a small number of armed personnel, similar to an observation mission. These armed troops are expected to observe and report on compliance with the comprehensive agreement. Additionally, in many situations, they serve to separate belligerents by stationing themselves in buffer zones or assisting in disarming and demobilizing the warring factions. Take, for example, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), which was established in 1997.

2.3.3 Multidimensional Missions

The implementation of a complete peacekeeping agreement requires a mix of military and civilian personnel working together to achieve this goal. In addition to the tasks that are carried out by observer missions and traditional missions, the objectives of these missions are to establish a secure and stable environment while also strengthening the capacity of state institutions like the police and the army to provide adequate security while also fully respecting human rights and the rule of law; additionally, these missions are tasked with organizing, conducting, and supervising elections. This is the category that includes the United Nations Transition Assistant Group (UNTAG) in Namibia from 1989 to 1990, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) from 1991 to 1995, and the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from 1992 to 1994 (Williams, 2015).

CHAPTER THREE

3.The role of UN AU and EU in peacekeeping of Somalia

3.1 UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has maintained its humanitarian aid in Somalia despite the upheaval that followed the removal of President Siad Barre from office. The UN's complete presence in the nation dates back to March 1991. In the following months, the unstable security situation in Somalia forced the United Nations to withdraw its personnel from the country on multiple occasions. Despite this, the UN did its best to keep its humanitarian operations going in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations. (Williams, 2015).

Because of the terrifying situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation became actively involved in the political aspects of the disaster and pushed for a solution to the dispute.

On December 27, 1991, General Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar informed the Security Council that he wanted to take action in order to restore peace in Somalia. He stated that he intended to take an initiative. Following a discussion with the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he requested that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, James O.C. Jonah, make a trip to the area in question. (Williams, 2015).

In January 1992, Mr. Jonah led a delegation of top United Nations officials on a trip to Somalia, despite the fact that combat was ongoing in Mogadishu. During that visit, the leaders of all of the factions in Mogadishu voiced their support for a ceasefire, with the exception of General Aidid. On the other hand, there was complete agreement that

the United Nations should play a role in bringing about national reconciliation. (Williams, 2015).

The Security Council passed Resolution 746 (1992), which lent its backing to the decision made by the Secretary-General to dispatch a technical team to Somalia in order to arrange for a ceasefire there. In addition to this requirement, the council stipulated that the committee devise a strategy with a greater priority to ensure humanitarian aid delivery. The crew travelled to Somalia from the 23rd of March all the way through the 1st of April. On March 28 and 27, 1992, respectively, the temporary commander Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed letters of understanding about monitoring the ceasefire and plans for the equitable and effective delivery of humanitarian relief. (ibid).

3.1.1. Establishment of UNOSOM

In response to the suggestion made by the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 (1992), which stated that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) would be established on April 24, 1992. The Council has requested that the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, discuss with all parties in Somalia on convening a summit on national reconciliation and unity.

The monitoring of a ceasefire by fifty unarmed United Nations military observers was settled upon in accordance with agreements reached with two key Somali factions in Mogadishu. Regarding humanitarian assistance, the security personnel expected in the contracts were UN personnel. They were tasked with providing security and protection for equipment and supplies at ports and airports in Mogadishu. From those locations, they delivered humanitarian supplies to the city's distribution centers that were located in the immediate vicinity of the city.

The Secretary-General reported to the SC that the two primary groups in Mogadishu had agreed to end unarmed spectators' participation immediately. Imtiaz Shaheen, a Pakistani Brigadier General and the Chief Military Observer for UNOSOM arrived in Mogadishu at the beginning of July 1992, together with the Party of UNOSOM monitors. After a significant amount of time and several obstacles, the Secretary-General told the Security Council that an agreement had been struck with important faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations personnel as part of the UNOSOM in the city. The Republican Party has given its OK to donate to this cause. Mogadishu was the destination of the initial arrival of the first unit of security troops on September 14, 1992. (Williams, 2015).

3.1.2. Expansion of UNOSOM

Consultations with various Somali leaders were held by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General beginning on May 4, 1992, and continuing until July 19, 1992. The Secretary-General briefed the Council on the difficult political and security climate that exists in Somalia, as well as the dire situation that the nation is in terms of the need for humanitarian assistance, recovery plans, and the reestablishment of its institutions. The Secretary-General decided that the United Nations should "change" its role in Somalia and increase its efforts to bring about an effective ceasefire while simultaneously fostering reconciliation inside the nation itself.

On July 27, 1992, the Security Council endorsed the report submitted by the Secretary-General and issued a request to all parties and groups in Somalia to support the United Nations in its efforts to deliver immediate humanitarian aid to the victims. The council voted unanimously in favor of this resolution, so the council has decided to dispatch an additional technical team to Somalia. (ibid).

On the 28th of August in 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 775 (1992), which approved the report submitted by the Secretary-General and agreed to increase the size of the UNOSOM force. The Council has requested that the Secretary-General begin his efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the problems in Somalia in

partnership with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. (ibid).

3.1.3 Deployment of United Nations Task Force (UNITAF)

The first components of the UNITAF were led on December 9, 1992, in Mogadishu. During that time period, the soldiers of UNITAF expanded their operations in Somalia to include important humanitarian sites. The primary objective of UNITAF was to establish a secure environment in Somalia in order to facilitate the delivery of urgent humanitarian aid. After it was finished, the United Nations took over the armed forces' leadership. During this time, UNOSOM was in charge of the overall political situation in Somalia as well as the delivery of humanitarian supplies there. UNITAF and the United Nations have achieved a high level of cooperation both on the field and at the headquarters of the UN. UNOSOM continued to maintain its presence in the capital, where it resumed its cooperation with UNITAF and made plans to restart normal peacekeeping operations. (Britannica, 2014).

In addition to the forces contributed by the United States, UNITAF welcomed members from the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Emirates, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. (Williams, 2015).

On December 19, 1992, the Secretary-General gave a report to the Security Council in which he outlined his thoughts on a new mission for UNOSOM and its transition from UNITAF to PKOs. The report also detailed the actions taken to execute Resolution 794 (1992), passed in 1992. The Secretary-General suggested to the Council that they postpone their decision on making such a change until it was obvious whether or not UNITOF had been successful in achieving their goal. The Secretary-General advised that it should wait until the ceasefire, the control of heavy weapons, the development of a new police force, and the disarming of criminal groups before moving forward. (ibid).

In a separate report presented to the Council on January 26, 1993, the Secretary-General of UNITAF extended his congratulations to the Government for the prompt and effective protection of critical population centers and the uninterrupted supply and distribution of humanitarian supplies. Regarding the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), he explained that its primary focus at the time was on making preparations to transition from the activities of UNITAF to those of UNOSOM II. (Britannica, 2014).

3.1.4 Peace Agreements

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General ordered a meeting at the ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from January 4 to 15, 1993, and ordered UN-sponsored National Reconciliation Conference. The meeting was attended by a total of 14 Somali political movements, including representatives of the LAS, OAU and OIC General Secretaries and the Chairman of the Standing Committee and the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement.

At the meeting the following three agreements were concluded and signed:

1: 8 January 1993 General Agreement

2: the terms of the ceasefire agreement and the methods of disarmament and

3: the criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation Conference and the agreement to create an ad hoc committee to assist in resolving any issues pending the agenda and the informal meeting.

On March 15, 1993, the informal assembly agreed to convene a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa. (Williams, 2015).

3.1.5 Transition to UNOSOM II

The Secretary-General reported to the SC on his proposals for the transition from UNITOF to UNOSOM II on March 3, 1993. Since the adoption of Council Resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, UNITOF has sent about 37,000 troops to south and central Somalia. UNITAF's presence and activities have had a positive effect on Somalia's security situation and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the country still had no functioning government, no organized civil police force and

no decent national armed forces. The security threat posed by the UN and its agencies, UNITOF, the ICRC and NGOs were even greater in parts of Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. Moreover, neither UNITOF nor UNOSOM troops were deployed in the Northeast and Northwest or on the Kenya-Somalia border, where security continued to be a concern. (Britannica, 2014).

Therefore, if the Security Council decided that the time has come for UNITOF to switch from UNOSOM II, the latter must grant enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN charter to establish a safe environment across Somalia. The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military unit of 20,000 and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide logistical support to carry out the assigned tasks. In addition, the US government agreed in principle to provide a tactical rapid reaction force to help UNOSOM II's commander. UNOSOM II would include civil servants, numbering approximately 2,800. The Secretary-General recommended May 1, 1993, the date for the transfer of budget and administrative authority from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was then decided that the military command transfer would take place on May 4th. (Williams, 2015).

3.1.6 Establishment of UNOSOM II

On March 26, 1993, the Security Council adopted Article 814 (1993) under Article VII of the UN Charter, which decided to expand the scope and mandate of UNOSOM according to the recommendations of the Secretary-General. The Security Council made this decision in accordance with Article VII of the UN Charter. It approved to prolong the mission of UNOSOM all the way up to October 31, 1993. It demanded that all parties involved in the conflict in Somalia completely adhere to their duties, particularly the agreement on the implementation of the ceasefire as well as the measures of disarmament outlined by the Council. They made sure that the employees of all organizations who were providing humanitarian aid or other types of assistance to Somalia were safe. In accordance with Resolution 733 (1992), all of the geographically close nations have been urged to work together to uphold the arms embargo. (Tubbs, 1997).

Other provisions of the resolution issued a call to action to the Secretary-General of the Council, requesting that they, through their Special Representative, and with the assistance of all relevant UN agencies, provide humanitarian assistance and other forms of aid to the people of Somalia in order to assist with their political rehabilitation. The assistance consists of repatriation of refugees and people who have been displaced in Somalia, relief for the economy and the restoration of Somalia, the re-creation of national and regional institutions throughout the country, the establishment of Somali police, and public information activities in support of United Nations operations in Somalia. (Williams, 2015).

3.2 African Union (AU) Approach to Peacekeeping Mission

The United Nations is responsible for the vast majority of the peacekeeping operations carried out; nevertheless, quite often, regional organizations have sent a peace mission to guarantee peace and stability. The underlying circumstances on the African continent, which have motivated the African Union's structured approach to conflict settlement, would be the starting point for an analysis of the African Union (AU) strategy for peacekeeping missions. The United Nations has overseen a large number of peacekeeping operations, each of which has had a unique category, length of time, and degree of success. On the other hand, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War at the beginning of the nineties brought about a significant shift in the security landscape across the African continent. There was a decline in desire on the part of the superpowers to pursue major friends in the area. In addition, these shifts occurred during a time when the United Nations Security Council was steadily cultivating a lusterless indifference towards the security challenges of the African region. This was due to the fact that super powers were becoming discriminatory to get involved in oversea peacekeeping operations because they were regarded as having low strategic importance (Charles 2010). It is also clear that many Africans are troubled by the ineffectiveness of international players in restraining wars on the continents. For example, the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur have dragged on for a long time with little or no progress. In addition, the death of civilians, the rapid movement of refugees, and the continued internal

displacement of the population are still ongoing issues. These days, the functioning of international organizations is almost often referred to in terms comparable to "failure." Given the lack of advancement, it is evident that there is a desire for an alternative (Messner 2009).

In addition, due to the realities of the situation and the lack of interest shown by the world's leading powers in the United Nations Security Council, it has been suggested that Africa should take a more proactive role in addressing the threats to its national security (Charles 2010).

Although the Organization of African Union (OAU) Charter 1963 assigns as one of the organization's functions the provision of a resolution to disagreements that arise on the African continent through the establishment of a commission on negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, this has not been implemented (OAU Charter 1963, Article VIII, No 4). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has a poor track record when it comes to participating in Africa's conflicts, despite the fact that it has significantly highlighted the necessity for peaceful settlement of conflicts. This, however, has been attributed to the "non-intervention" clause in the Charter of the OAU and considering the fact that it was never formed to fulfill the function of peacekeeper but rather as an agency to improve African Unity, it makes sense that this would be the case (Murray, 2004). This occurrence was brought to our attention by Salim, who served as the previous Secretary-General of the OAU. He stated that "there is a strong stance that conflicts inside states rest solely within the competence and jurisdiction of the affected nations." As a result, the OAU has no right to become involved and does not have the authority to seek its participation in the resolution of disputes in nations that are now at war with one another. As a direct consequence of this, the OAU has been reduced to a position of virtual helplessness as these conflicts have resulted in the disintegration of states, the destruction of infrastructure and property, the deaths of millions of people, the creation of refugees and the displacement of civilians, and the infliction of intense pain and suffering on innocent civilians (Salim, quoted in Cannie Peck 1998).

The United Nations Charter is generally used as the primary legal foundation for governing peacekeeping operations that are mandated under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The eighth chapter of the United Nations Charter recognizes the presence of regional agencies and their function as subordinates in the effort to address security concerns. The United Nations Charter, on the other hand, places primary responsibility for the maintenance of global security concerns squarely on the shoulders of the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC). In addition, Charter VIII of the United Nations Charter mandated that all peacekeeping missions must first be resolved by peaceful means before resorting to the use of force in the name of self-defense, which must be notified to the United Nations promptly (Dace 2013).

The Organization of African Unity did not include a clause that allowed the use of armed conflict as a method for resolving disputes on the African continent. The OAU charter was based on the principle of non-intervention and outlined the use of numerous conventional methods for resolving conflicts, including conciliation, mediation, and negotiation (Charles 2010). OAU had been dormant and had restricted its duty in resolving border disputes since it was founded in 1963. This was because OAU adhered to the concept of non-interference in the affairs of member states, which required it to refrain from meddling in its internal affairs (Jannie 2012). In 1993, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a mechanism for managing, settling, and preventing disputes under the name Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. This was done to produce a more robust response to security threats on the continent (Kristiana 2005). The mechanism was created with the following goals in mind: (1) Anticipation and prevention of disputes from escalating into full war; (2) Undertaking of peacekeeping and peace building responsibilities if full war does occur; and (3) Performing peacekeeping and peace building functions in the situation that follows full war (ibid).

The Organization of African Union (OAU) was renamed the African Union (Union) on July 9, 2002. This change brought about a substantial transformation in the ideas that guided the peacekeeping operations formerly carried out under the OAU (Charles

2010). The Peace and Security Council was the primary conflict prevention mechanism for which the OAU was responsible before the AU took over (Jakkie 2002). The newly founded African Union (AU) Constitutive Act (CA) renounced the previously held policy of non-intervention in favor of the principle of non-difference in the signatories' respective nations' domestic affairs (Marusa 2014, p. 4). In a severe scenario, such as the commission of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, the African Union is required by Article 4 (h) of the CA to interfere in the internal affairs of one of its member states (ibid). Despite this, the development of this system resulted in a greater number of acts that were, for the most part, fruitless since they were constrained by the principle of non-intervention (Jannie 2012, & Kristiana 2005). When this provision is examined more closely, it appears to indicate that it is intended to protect innocent civilians and permit the African Union to take necessary steps, which may involve military actions, whenever there is a grave situation, even without the permission of the state that is concerned (Benedek et al. 2010). In addition, Makina et al. (2007) argue that the change from the OAU to the AU demonstrates that the legal and institutional mechanisms of the AU were better equipped to efficiently and effectively contain any and all forms of security threats and insecurity that resulted from political-related issues in Africa.

Article 13 of the PSC Protocol requires the establishment of an African Standby Force in order to provide the Peace and Security Council (PSC) the authority to carry out the objectives it has set for itself in relation to the African Union's (AU) peacekeeping operations (ASF). "Must be comprised of multifunctional contingent with civilian and military elements in their countries of origin and ready for fast deployment at the right moment" is how the standby force is described (PSC Protocol Article 13.1). The African Union Peace and Security Council describes operations to maintain peace as having several dimensions. The revision that the AU made to the PSO encompasses all of the many aspects of peacekeeping that are discussed by V.P. Fortna in her book "Does Peacekeeping Work?" The most essential point that Dersso (2010) makes is that the ASF is not the same thing as national troops. In reality, the ASF is not a permanent force; rather, its standby adaption will be achieved based on the commitments made

by member states of the African Union (AU) and the level of readiness demonstrated by the Regional Economic Council (REC) and Regional Mechanisms (RM).

In spite of the fact that the OAU has been replaced by the African Union (AU) and the concept of non-intervention in favor of non-indifference with regard to peacekeeping operations, the AU's actions are devoid of any positive qualities. According to Vogt (2005), African and intergovernmental organizations still lag in establishing and deploying extensive peacekeeping missions' capacity that includes military, police, and civilian elements. This is the case despite the fact that the African Union (AU) employs a multidimensional approach to achieving peace. Vogt adds further that there have only been a few investigations of the peacekeeping operations that the AU has led, and these investigations have shown that the AU has been significantly constrained in meeting the enormous demand. In further tests of the AU capability in PSO, contradicting findings have been found. According to the findings of the research that was carried out by Agoagye (2004) on the African Operation in Burundi (AMIB), which was deployed in 2003, the success of the mission was expressly mixed. Since the rebel continued to fight, although the operation contained security concerns in some places of Burundi, it is impossible to say that AMIB entirely strengthened the execution of the ceasefire agreement because of this fact. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) plan and the reintegration of former soldiers into civilian life were not able to be facilitated by the mission. According to Appiah (2005), the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), founded in June 2014, has been a restricted mission since it was established. This claim is made in research undertaken on AMIS's difficulties and limitations. Because there are not enough soldiers to defend the population, there is a serious lack of operational capability, and there is a lack of logistical support, the operation that the AU is conducting is perceived by observers as being futile and fruitless. Feldman (2008) further research shows that the African Union's armed forces can never live up to the tasks they are given. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was unable to stop the civil conflict that is still going on in the Darfur region of Sudan. There are not enough funds, not enough trained troops, not enough effective counterterrorism or counterinsurgency skills, and not enough political willingness among the AU member states for them to successfully intervene in Africa's internal conflicts (ibid). The fact that the African Union's approach to

peacekeeping lacks a well-articulated framework for peacekeeping and that its practices have been erratic, hasty, and incautiously planned is another challenge related to the paradigm shift that the African Union and its multidimensional peacekeeping arrangements are undergoing (Murithi 2009).

In his analysis of the multifaceted purpose of the African Union, Williams (2011) provides evidence that the commitment of the AU member states is open to debate. He contends that Article 4 Clause H has not been utilized to this day in order to legitimize the use of armed force against the AU Member States and that this should change. For example, the situation of Ivory Coast and Libya in 20011 illustrates the unwillingness and lack of commitment of the African Union to use Article 4 (h), despite the fact that the United Nations Security Council acknowledged the commission of crimes against humanity in both of those countries.

Since 2003, the African Union has dispatched nine missions with the mandate to support peacekeeping efforts. These missions include the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB, 2003–2004), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004–2007), the African Union Mission Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC, 2006), the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros (MAES, 2007), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007–present), While some of the missions have been deemed successful, such as AMISEC and AMIB, others, such as AFISMA, MISCA, and AMIS, have been transformed into full-fledged United Nations operations. Currently, the African Union is solely in charge of one peacekeeping operation called AMISOM, and it works in conjunction with the United Nations to administer the United Nations—African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition, the African Union (AU) has given its approval for the formation of three different missions, which are as follows: the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; the G5 Sahel Joint Force; and the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the eradication of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA).

3.2.1 AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia

The African Union (AU), with the approval of the United Nations, is in charge of running the active regional peacekeeping force known as AMISOM. On January 19, 2007, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) established it with an initial mandate lasting for six months. IGASOM, also known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia, was succeeded by AMISOM, which absorbed its functions. The African Union (AU) approved a plan for an IGAD deployment in Somalia to provide protection and training in September of 2006. The United Nations Security Council also approved the establishment of IGASOM (AMISOM, 2015).

IGASOM is an acronym for the Islamic Gulf Arab States Organization for Stabilization and Operations in Somalia (TFG). IGASOM was initially proposed for implementation in March 2005 in order to provide peacekeeping forces for the Somali conflict. This was when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu and when the majority of hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government. Despite this, the UIC had successfully taken control of the capital by June 2006. Despite this, preparations for IGASOM continued to be developed despite criticism from the UIC, which saw it as a project supported by the United States of America and intended to stifle the expansion of the Islamic movement. The United Nations Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on the UIC until December 2006; however, the embargo was partially removed, and a mandate for IGASOM was announced in December 2006. (AMISOM, 2015).

Adopting resolution 1744 on the 20th of February in 2007, the United Nations Security Council gave the African Union the go-light to send a peacekeeping operation with a mandate that would last for six months (2007). The United Nations asked for a report on the possibility of a peacekeeping mission by the UN to be submitted within sixty days. The purpose of the mission was to assist with a national reconciliation assembly. The African Union was given permission by the United Nations Security Council in October 2014 (Resolution 2182 (2014)) to keep its operation in Somalia going until

November 30, 2015. The Security Council has permitted AMISOM to take any and all measures that may be necessary in order to provide support for dialogue and reconciliation. This support will consist of assisting with free movement, safe passage, and protection of all stakeholders participating in a national reconciliation congress. These stakeholders include political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders, and civil society representatives (ibid).

The AMISOM is made up of several individual parts. In this piece, the focus is on the military aspect of the situation. The military component is the most important part of the AMISOM organization. It is tasked with the responsibility of carrying out peace support activities in Somalia. It tries to stabilize the situation in the nation, establish a climate that is conducive to the implementation of humanitarian activities, and eventually pass over responsibility for the mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Additionally, this component helps ensure the safety of Somalia's vital infrastructure, such as the country's airports and seaports, while ensuring the security of the country's federal institutions as they carry out their duties (ibid).

At the moment, the military component is made up of soldiers who have been recruited from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Ethiopia. These are stationed across Somalia's south and central regions in six different sectors. The areas of Banadir and Lower Shabelle are also a part of Sector 1, where Ugandan troops are now stationed. The responsibility for Sector 2, which includes Lower and Middle Jubba, is with the Kenyan armed forces. Ethiopian forces are in charge of the Sector 3 area, which includes Bay and Bakool in addition to Gedo (Sub Sector 3). Djiboutian soldiers are in control of the area known as Sector 4, which includes both Hiiraan and Galgaduud. Sector 5, which encompasses the Middle Shabelle region, is under the command of the Burundian armed forces. In addition, Sierra Leonean forces are in control of Sector Kismayo, which encompasses both the port city and the areas around it (Mwangi). Since its first deployment in March 2007, the military component of AMISOM has been of critical importance in assisting the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) in driving Al-Shabaab out of a significant portion of southern Somalia, including the majority of the country's main towns and cities (ibid).

3.2.1.1 AMISOM's structural and operational weaknesses and responsibility to protect

The UN Capstone Doctrine of 2008 defines the fundamental principles that direct the design and execution of UN peacekeeping operations. It also provides an overview of the nature, scope, and primary responsibilities of UN peacekeeping missions (UN, 2008). According to the theory, the purpose of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations is to lend assistance to the restoration and extension of state authority. This is done in the hopes that the state would be able to develop and give fundamental political and socio-economic goods to its population. The peacekeeping operations do this by establishing a secure environment that is conducive to stability, providing political leadership, offering operational assistance to state institutions, and coordinating the activities of many other international players (UN, 2008). According to the Capstone Doctrine, the actions of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) for the military component of the peacekeeping operation should be guided by the tasks set out by the mission's UN-authorized mandate, concept of operation (CONOPS), and the accompanying mission rules of engagement (ROE). This is because the TCCs are responsible for the military component of the operation (ibid).

While it comes to the implementation of the responsibility to protect, the second pillar explains that preventative measures can be either structural or operational. This is important information to bear in mind when discussing the role of peacekeeping operations in this process. The goal of structural prevention, which is intended to be implemented over the long term and is difficult to evaluate, is to transform the precarious structural conditions that contribute to a state's fragility or collapse into conditions that make it easier to restore and restore expand state authority. Operation Prevention is a short-term strategy with the goal of preventing an atrocity from occurring in the near future. In order to do this, considerations about preventing atrocities need to be brought into harmony with concurrent concerns regarding avoiding conflicts. Under the second pillar, one may consider the dispatching of peacekeeping operations in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter or military troops in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN, 2011). This essay

places a greater focus on operational prevention given the mandate of AMISOM and the fact that it is a mission to maintain peace in the region. This part explores the way in which AMISOM's structural and, consequently, operational shortcomings stemming from its mandate, CONOPS, and ROE adversely influence its obligation to protect in Somalia. This section is situated within the larger context of the previous section.

3.2.1.2 The Mandate of AMISOM

It is arguable that the motivations for AMISOM's deployment, and more crucially, its initial and later mandates, are to blame for the organization's structural and operational flaws, which in turn limit the organization's potential to perform its intended functions. The preference for an African peacekeeping mission in Somalia was not the driving factor for its deployment; rather, the absence of credible options was the driving factor behind its deployment. The current difficult security situation in the nation, along with the absence of a peace agreement, caused the United Nations Security Council to conclude that a United Nations peacekeeping deployment would be inappropriate under the current circumstances of a state of collapse (Wiklund, 2013). However, its operational capabilities, notably its CONOPS and ROE, were negatively impacted directly due to its initial mandate, making its structural deficiencies a more essential factor to consider. Due to the institutional and, as a result, operational constraints of AMISOM, it is unable to successfully carry out its mandate because it lacks the financial, human, and military resources necessary.

The structure of AMISOM's initial mandate, which focuses more on providing assistance for transitional federal institutions than on fostering peace-building, is the root cause of the current structural difficulties that the mission is experiencing. The inference here is that the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) have authorized AMISOM to act as an extension of their authority (Atta-Asamoah, A., & Segui, N. R. 2014). In point of fact, international military support to Somalia has given more attention to the processes of strengthening the capacity of AMISOM and its TCCs than it has to building the ability of the Somali National Security Force (SNSF) (Williams, 2013). As a result, this enables AMISOM

and its TCCs to pursue their interests rather than the mission's mandate, jeopardizing their responsibilities to defend those they are tasked to safeguard.

AMISOM's initial mandate, which ran from 2006 to 2007, called for the organization to carry out peacekeeping operations in Somalia. It was tasked with the following responsibilities: (1) supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by working with all stakeholders; (2) providing protection to transitional federal institutions (TFIs) and key infrastructure to enable them to carry out their functions; (3) assisting in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP); (4) providing technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts in the country; and (5) monitoring the security situation in the country (AMISOM, 2015). Additionally, the organization was tasked with bringing stability to the country's situation to pave the way for the United Nations to take over responsibility for the region immediately.

AMISOM has been tasked with the following responsibilities as part of its current mandate: (1) take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia national defense and public safety institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; (2) assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory; and (3) assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through appropriate support in a variety of sectors. (6) Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the return of refugees; (7) Facilitate coordinated support by relevant African Union institutions and structures; (ibid).

As was previously said, AMISOM TCCs are given the latitude to pursue their own strategic objectives in Somalia, even if it means going against the mandate of the operation. This is exactly what is going on; the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) component of AMISOM that is located in Sector 2 is pursuing its strategic interests rather than the mission's mandate, which is putting the responsibility to protect at risk.

The KDF has disregarded the tasks outlined in the mandate by taking on a partisan role in local-level governance, aiding and abetting corruption, and depriving the FGS of revenue. Additionally, the KDF has compromised dialogue and reconciliation efforts by exacerbating rather than mitigating clan rivalry and tensions, and it has interfered with the smooth implementation of Somali national security plans. All of these actions have undermined efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia (Chopra, 2014).

A significant part of AMISOM's mission is to offer security governance in order to lessen the dangers that violent armed opposition groups pose to the country's safety. In particular, it is intended to take any and all necessary steps, as appropriate and in harmony with the institutions of Somalia's national defense and public safety, to lessen the threat presented by Al-Shabaab and other violent armed non-state actors. The objective is to create a political and security climate in Somalia that is conducive to the establishment of legitimate and efficient governance.

AMISOM is also tasked with the responsibility of assisting the FGS in the process of establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across the entirety of Somalia. This is to be accomplished by providing assistance, as needed, in the areas of security, as well as the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, the rule of law, and the delivery of basic services.

Given the frequently negative nature and effects of clan politics in the country, AMISOM needs to fulfil its mandated task of supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia. This can be accomplished by facilitating the free movement, safe passage, and protection of all individuals and groups involved in peace-making efforts.

AMISOM's other mission is to provide, to the extent that it is able and, as needed, technical and other support for the development of the capacity of Somalia's state institutions, most notably the institutions responsible for national defense and public safety and public service. This support is intended to be provided within AMISOM's means and as needed. It is hoped that this would be accomplished in part by making it easier for the Somali government to carry out its objectives for national security.

In addition, the United Nations Security Council has instructed that AMISOM provide the conditions favorable for UN personnel to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The United Nations emphasizes The United Nations emphasizes that its Monitoring Group on Somalia has been unable to carry out its mission effectively in Kismayo in part owing to the lack of cooperation from the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF).

3.2.1.3 AMISOM's strategic concept of operations

The structural and operational restrictions of AMISON'S CONOPS have, to a considerable extent, negatively impacted the organization's operations. The first version of AMISON's CONOPS was updated and approved in 2012. African Union and United Nations planners collaborated to design a strategic concept for future AMISOM operations in Somalia. The concept was developed in light of the hostile political and security circumstances that currently exist in Somalia. This concept aimed to extend the authority of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) beyond Mogadishu and to create an environment that was conducive to the efficient execution of AMISOM's mandate by combining all of the separate military operations that were already taking place in Somalia into a single, coordinated and comprehensive effort against Al-Shabaab. On January 5, 2012, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union gave its approval to the strategic idea (UN, 2012). The updated CONOPS called for the completion of three stages. In Phase I, the focus was going to be on increasing the number of AMISOM forces to the UN-approved level so that they could protect Mogadishu and the surrounding area from potential dangers and also foster an atmosphere that was conducive to political discourse and reconciliation. During Phase II, AMISOM's activities were expanded throughout the rest of Somalia, particularly in the country's south and center. The purpose of Phase III was to provide the groundwork for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force that would succeed AMISOM and, over the long term, contribute more to the efforts of Somalia's government to rebuild and stabilize the country. The updated CONOPS was predicated on the availability of various military assets, including air and marine capabilities, in addition to other force enablers (AU, 2011).

The initial and amended CONOPS for AMISOM has been severely hampered by the mission's lack of necessary financial, human, and military resources, which has rendered the mission inefficient in carrying out the activities that it has been tasked to carry out. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and several bilateral partners contribute to the financial stability of AMISOM. However, these monetary donations are limited to covering only the aforementioned locations and time periods. Therefore, funding for AMISOM continues to be unpredictably inconsistent and unreliable. Although AMISOM's military component has achieved a significant amount of The International Journal of Human Rights operational success, the organization cannot expand its area of operations due to its current force strength. This is because the organization lacks critical multipliers and enablers, such as a guard force and air assets, which would allow it to expand its area of operations more effectively. AMISOM does not possess the operational capacity to recover and extend state authority until the SNSF has developed the capacity needed to take over responsibility for the security of the recovered areas. Until the SNSF has developed the necessary capacity, AMISOM cannot recover and extend state authority. For this reason, multipliers and enablers are required for AMISOM to finish its mission. This is especially true when it comes to attacking Al-Shabaab's strategic resources, providing air cover for supply convoys, and assisting AMISOM in reaching regions where it presently has little or no presence (AU, 2013).

The use of force is integral to AMISOM's stability operations because the mission's primary objective is to maintain peace; this is especially true when interacting with Al-Shabaab. In the event that a state is in the process of collapsing, actions to maintain stability might be compared to counterinsurgency operations. However, in order for stability operations, which are an essential part of effective counterinsurgency, this involves establishing credibility in the early phases of the campaign. In order to do this, one must engage in careful preparation before to the launch of any military expedition (Gregg, H. S., 2009). Evidence shows that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) did not develop or execute an effective counterinsurgency strategy during the early phases of the conflict. It does not give the impression that it has a counterinsurgency plan for the long run (Turbville et al.). It is clear that

AMISOM does not have a successful counterinsurgency strategy, as evidenced by the fact that only a small percentage of its forces continue to use counterinsurgency strategies after having driven Al-Shabaab from its strongholds. This decreases the likelihood that such policies will achieve the longer-term effects of strengthening good governance and establishing peace as planned (ibid). AMISOM does not appear to have conceptualized what it believes to be a triumph, which suggests that the organization did not participate in essential long-range planning that would have included an exit strategy (ibid). The UN Capstone Doctrine states that a peacekeeping operation's entry strategy and subsequent exit strategy are two of the most important factors in determining whether or not the mission is successful in accomplishing its mandate. According to the doctrine, experience demonstrates that "a domestic peace is truly sustainable when the warring parties are able to move their struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where disputes can be settled peacefully." This is based on the assertion that "a domestic peace is genuinely sustainable when the warring parties are able to move their struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where (Koops, J. A., MacQueen, N., Tardy, T., & Williams, P. D., 2015). Due to the fact that Al-Shabaab has been institutionalized, it is extremely difficult to eradicate either militarily or psychologically since the group has infiltrated every aspect of sociopolitical and economic life (Maxwell, D., & Majid, N., 2015). Therefore, AMISOM needs a counterinsurgency strategy that is effective in order to prevent Al-Shabaab from waging a successful asymmetrical campaign. Such a campaign would be devastating for the population mentally and physically, and it would also be detrimental to the processes of peace-building and governance (Bryden, M., 2014).

3.2.1.4 AMISOM’s rules of engagement

The normative framework for UN peacekeeping operations includes international human rights law as an essential component of its normative framework. It is imperative that peacekeeping operations be carried out with due regard for human rights, as specified in the United Nations Declaration for Human Rights, and that these operations genuinely advance human rights via the execution of the mandates given to

them by their respective missions. In the event that members of a peacekeeping force are found to have violated the rights of civilians, they must be held responsible for their actions. In particular, international humanitarian law (IHL), which is also referred to as "the law of war" or "the law of armed conflict," and which is contained in the Geneva Convention and other protocols, places limitations on the tactics that can be used in armed conflicts and are intended to protect individuals who are not directly involved in the fighting. It protects the basic rights of civilians, victims, and other non-combatants who are caught in the middle of armed conflict. The principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) must be well understood and constructively applied by UN peacekeepers in both combat and post-conflict settings. The essential principles and fundamental standards of international law that apply to UN troops are outlined in the Bulletin on the Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law that was issued on August 6, 1999, by the UN Secretary-General (Koops et al.).

The Capstone Doctrine emphasizes how critical it is to adhere to the ROE when conducting a peacekeeping mission. In it, it is mentioned that the mission-wide ROE for the military component of a UN peacekeeping operation specifies the multiple levels of force that can be used in particular circumstances, how each level of force should be used, and any authorizations that commanders must seek. These rules of engagement should be sufficiently rigorous to guarantee that a peacekeeping operation maintains its credibility and autonomy in order to carry out its mandate in the war and post-conflict contexts in which it is frequently deployed in the present day. The mission's leadership must ensure that all relevant people fully understand these ROE within the mission and that they are consistently enforced (ibid). The ROE of AMISOM has, however, been negatively impacted as a result of the mission's structural and operational restrictions, which has led to a compromise in the organization's ability to carry out its duties in relation to the responsibility to protect. In Somalia, AMISOM has been responsible for abuses of human rights, in particular the infliction of damage and death on people, as well as its soldiers indulging in sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls (Mwangi, 2015).

The AMISOM Rules of Engagement (ROE) are essential to ensuring that military operations are carried out in accordance with the requirements imposed by IHL in the socio-political environment of Somalia. Despite the fact that the ROE were updated in 2012 in order to ensure that they are in accordance with the operational realities of the mission, AMISOM continues to operate in extremely volatile conditions brought on by the collapse of the state. These conditions are caused by the fact that Al-Shabaab uses asymmetrical warfare to target civilians within populated areas. This includes Al-Shabaab bombing regions populated by civilians, the deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the use of civilians as human shields, and disguising as civilians when assaults against AMISOM and the Somali authority. Due to the pervasive nature of the situation, AMISOM finds it particularly challenging to secure the protection of civilians over the course of its operations and to implement the mission's ROE in a manner that is constant and consistent at all times (Williams, 2013).

A major obstacle that AMISOM must overcome is ensuring the safety of civilians while adhering to its rules of engagement. The necessity of protecting people has posed a key conundrum for AMISOM. The mission of AMISOM was to provide basic services and humanitarian assistance to a significant number of Mogadishu's suffering civilians in the absence of humanitarian actors on the ground, protect very important persons involved in the political reconciliation process and fight off Al-Shabaab and other violent armed non-state actors. On the other hand, members of AMISOM have been depicted as providing assistance to the merciless occupying Ethiopian National Defense Force in Mogadishu (ibid). Both directly and indirectly, by their failure to protect people from Al-Shabaab attacks, AMISOM's military operations have caused injury to civilians. Direct harm has been caused to civilians by AMISOM's tactics of indiscriminate firing and their targeting of civilians (Mwangi, 2015). These issues have been made worse by a number of factors, including (1) AMISOM's delayed adoption of an explicit protection-of-civilians mandate in May 2013; (2) the immense difficulty of accurately verifying the nature and perpetrators of civilian harm under conditions of state collapse; (3) Al-Shabab's of asymmetrical warfare tactics deliberately designed to increase the harm to civilians; and (4) repeated allegations that AMISOM had violated international humanitarian law and was unable to protect civilians (Williams,

2013). The general population of Somalia does not primarily rate AMISOM based on the number of Al-Shabaab combatants it has eliminated; rather, they evaluate the mission based on whether or not it successfully carried out its mandate while minimizing the number of civilian fatalities. A large number of civilians have been killed or injured as a direct result of AMISOM's deployment (ibid), and while it is impossible to generate exact numbers, AMISOM has stated that the ROE it employs are designed to minimize harm to civilians; however, civilians continue to report instances of harm to civilians. HRW has recorded a significant number of instances of indiscriminate and disproportionate shelling on the part of AMISOM. AMISOM carried out a small number of illegal attacks on civilians, and the organization has accepted responsibility for the deaths of civilians. Although AMISOM is operating in conditions of state collapse, the asymmetrical tactics Al-Shabaab use do not absolve AMISOM of its responsibility under international humanitarian law (IHL) to prevent indiscriminate attacks that result in disproportionate civilian casualties and loss of property (Mwangi, 2015).

AMISOM continues to make significant efforts, despite the conditions of state collapse, to ensure that its operations are carried out in compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). AMISOM is aware of its obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL) and relevant policies and guidelines established by the African Union (AU). These efforts include directing all of its sector commanders to strictly follow the UN Secretary-Human General's Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in the conduct of its operations and making recommendations on further measures to ensure better compliance with the HRDDP. In addition, these efforts include directing all of its sector commanders to conduct their operations in accordance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (AU, 2013). The formation of a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), which the United Nations Security Council approved in resolution 2036 (February 2012), is one example of the other initiatives (ibid). As mentioned previously in the report, in May of 2012, a strategy for protecting civilians over the entirety of the AMISOM deployment was authorized. The plan offers a comprehensive framework that can be used across the whole AMISOM mission to mainstream protection issues in all facets of the organization (Mwangi,

2015). As a fundamental element of its protection plan, AMISOM started taking steps toward the construction of a CCTARC, as called for in a number of resolutions passed by the Security Council. It was decided to develop a framework for the establishment of a robust mechanism within AMISOM. The framework focuses on the following three key functions of the cell: (1) assessing civilian harm occurring within AMISOM areas of responsibility; (2) assisting with operational effectiveness and prevention of civilian harm by informing force decision making; and (3) responding to any harm that has been caused (ibid). The CCTARC, which has started its activities, will have an additional resource in the form of a civilian casualty matrix that will be developed (AU, 2013).

In addition, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces have been accused of committing sexual and gender-based violence against Somali women and girls, particularly those driven from their homes (Badri, L., & Muscati, S. 2014). Some members of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been in Somalia since 2007 to assist in restoring peace in Mogadishu, have exploited their positions of authority in order to prey on the most vulnerable women and girls in the city. The troops are responsible for several instances of sexual violence, including rape, various types of sexual assault, and sexual exploitation. The exploitation of a person for sexual reasons typically entails the misuse of a vulnerable position, an imbalance of power, or trust between the parties involved. The Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, published in 2003 by the United Nations Secretary-General, is a policy document that supplements a number of policy pronouncements on sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping deployments. It makes it quite apparent that peacekeepers may not trade any form of currency, products, or services for sexual favors. It includes in its definition exploitation circumstances in which women and girls are vulnerable and in which there is a power difference between the parties involved. According to this definition, the question of whether or not a woman has given her permission to engage in sexual activity in exchange for financial gain is immaterial when applied to the context of peacekeeping. A prohibition on sexual exploitation and abuse is included in the AU Commission's Reviewed Code of Conduct (AUC Code of Conduct), which

AMISOM TCCs are required to adhere with. All AMISOM personnel, including locally recruited Somalis, are exempt from local legal proceedings in the country of deployment for any criminal acts they conduct while they are deployed. This is the same policy that applies to international peacekeeping missions. In the event that any of its employees commit a crime, the TCCs have exclusive authority to discipline and punish such employees. They are, however, obligated to investigate and prosecute serious allegations of misconduct and crimes in order to fulfill both the memorandums of understanding they signed with the AU prior to the deployment of their forces as well as the international human rights and humanitarian obligations they have (ibid).

The AMISOM TCCs have, to varying degrees, established procedures to deal with their forces' misconduct in order to address sexual exploitation and abuses, which are grave violations of human rights. This is done to combat sexual exploitation and abuses, which are severe human rights violations. These include providing pre-deployment training for soldiers on the AUC Code of Conduct and sending legal advisers and military investigators to Somalia to investigate complaints of improper conduct by service members. AMISOM's leadership first dismissed reports of sexual assault, but they have now begun to take some steps to address the issue. A draft policy on the prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse (also known as the PSEA policy) was produced by AMISOM in 2013. In addition to this, it has started putting systems in place to follow up on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (Ibid).

3.3 EUROPEAN UNION

The United Nations' previous attempts to intervene in Somalia were unsuccessful, which led the European Union to step in. At first, the European Union was hesitant to offer help to AMISOM due to the contentious deployment of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, which was supported by the United States, and the lack of enthusiasm shown by African Union member states (Balossi 2011, p. 79). Despite this, the European Union Council decided on April 23 to extend its military support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to include a military support component for establishing the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This decision was motivated by the

security interest in the maritime waterways that lead to Europe, which is threatened by piracy. The African Peace Facility (APF) is a mechanism that the European Union uses to support peace and security on the African continent through the support of EU signatories. Since 2007, the EU has been providing assistance to Somalia in the form of a developmental program, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy through the APF. It has created operational, financial and diplomatic initiatives in Somalia. As part of the operational plan, the European Union (EU) has approved the assignment of four specialists in civil engineering, budgeting, commutation, and human resources to the AMISOM Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) in Addis Ababa. These experts will provide important strategic and technical directives to AMISOM officials. EU has also initiated three operations to contain security threats; (1) the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR/Atlanta Operation) to detect and combat piracy off the waterways of Somalia and to support AMISOM in Safeguarding World Food Programme (WFP) vessels distributing food to poor Somalis; (2) the EU Air Force (EUAFOR/Atlanta Operation); and (3) the EU Border Force (EU Border Force Operation). (2) the European Union Military Training Mission (EUTM), which would teach potential members of the Somali security force, and (3) the European Union Combined Action in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP-Nestor), which will boost the regional marine strength of nations in the Horn of Africa (EU 2012).

On the diplomatic component, the EU has sponsored multiple peace process initiatives in Somalia. It has also participated in frequent interactions with international players and regional organizations to back national peace conferences (Giovanni et al. 2009). The European Union has provided major financial support to AMISOM through the African Peace and Stability Fund (APF). In September 2013, the EU donated €1.8 billion to AMISOM aid to end nearly 20 year's turmoil in the nation. EU Financial contribution to AMISOM between 2007 to 2013 total up to €579.3 million. This accounts for transportation, accommodation, communication, and medical care expenditures, soldier allowances, pay for law enforcement officers and civilian employees, and housing costs. Over € 200 million was the value of the financial commitment that the EU made to AMISOM in 2013. (African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013).

Despite considerable EU contributions to AMISOM, it has not sent its soldiers on the ground in Somalia (Norheim 2013). The efforts of the EU Peace Support Mission in Africa can be understood as a type of peacekeeping by proxy. The European Union has decided against sending ground troops to AMISOM and will provide political and financial assistance for the organization. It would appear that EU member states are hesitant to send their naval forces, including patrol boats, surveillance planes, and naval personnel, to the coast of Somalia (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012).

In terms of putting an end and preventing piracy, EUNAVFOR has failed to fulfill the requirements of its mandate. Even while it has made that pirates are less likely to be successful, the criminal behavior associated with them is still thriving. The pirates have improved their skills and capacities, which allows them to collect a greater amount of ransom than they did previously. Second, EUNAVFOR has been successful in discouraging pirates from seizing World Food Program vessels; however, this has not prevented the coordinated theft of humanitarian aid by criminals, militias, and the Somali Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) security forces, which prevents the aid from reaching poor Somalis (ibid). The fact that more than ninety percent of the detained pirates were freed without trial as a result of a lack of interest and competence by nations has promoted the proliferation of piracy in the region. Even while there is international jurisdiction to trial a pirate, there is no international requirement to do so. This means that it is up to the discretion of a state to decide whether or not to bring charges against the pirate (Van et al. 2012).

CHPTER FOUR

Analysis of Peacekeeping missions in Somalia

In this chapter the researcher will analyze why different peacekeeping operations in Somalia failed to fully stabilize Somalia, and bring long lasting peace and stability. The researcher will divide the PKO in Somalia into two different categories; United Nations operations, and African mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Applying the theoretical framework of realism described above, this chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the role of self-interest in the motivations of government engagement with AMISOM

4.1 Analyzing the failure of United Nations PKO in Somalia

Since the beginning of 1991, Somalia has been plagued by an ongoing and massive civil conflict, illicit activity, and starvation, all of which have resulted in fatalities. In 1992, a humanitarian group from across the world started sending supplies into Somalia in the hope of putting an end to starvation and misery there. Food had developed into a source of power in a nation that lacked an efficient administration and a well-developed support system. As a direct consequence, local "warlords" have begun to appropriate around 80 percent of the assistance supplies. (Armstrong, 1994).

In April of 1992, the United Nations General Assembly passed Security Council Resolution 751 (SCR 751), which authorized engagement in the civil conflict in Somalia and led to the founding of UNOSOM I. There were fifty United Nations military observers stationed in Mogadishu; nevertheless, their efforts to give aid in terms of security and negotiate an end to the conflict had shown very minimal effectiveness. In July, the United Nations made a request for additional relief planes for its member states. President George W. Bush responded to Operation Provided Relief, in which the United States authorized the deployment of military hardware. Delivering humanitarian assistance with a Pakistani security force of 500 individuals

to Somalia. Despite the high number of security personnel and the substantial amount of aid that was shipped to Somalia over the course of the following several months, the overall safety situation in the nation continued to deteriorate. (Arnaod, 1993).

Hunger estimates reached more than one thousand victims per day, and the spread of poverty in Somalia led to increasing social growth and pressure to "do something." (Baker, Caleb, 1993) The involvement of the military in the situation had been described by many as a "bottomless pit" at the Pentagon. In December 1992, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement stating that the situation in Somalia "poses a severe danger to world security." It has been officially decided that the Secretary-General and the associate states will "take all means necessary to ensure a safe haven for humanitarian work in Somalia." (Baker, James H., 1994). After that, President Bush initiated the mission known as RESTORE HOPE, in which the United States would provide 28,000 soldiers to the UNITAF. (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1994) During an appearance on Meet the Press, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney explained to the public that "our goal is to restore order so that relief work can continue, and then pass over the task of safeguarding the country to United Nations soldiers." (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1994). In principle, this may be a short-term position geared explicitly toward establishing a secure setting for the performance of public services. (The Establishment and Organization of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission, 1994).

From the 9th of December 1992 until the 4th of May 1993, when it joined the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), UNITAF successfully intervened in Somalia and carried out a mission there. Despite most of the troops returning to their own countries, the Clinton administration believed that UN control was the only viable option. Meanwhile, the increased United Nations force was responsible for disarming various combat factions in addition to numerous other nation-building efforts. As the security situation became increasingly precarious, the remaining United States soldiers found themselves in the position of having to defend themselves more and more rashly, and they aligned themselves with one of the fighting groups. (1994's "Improving the Capability of United Nations Peacekeeping").

On the evening of October 3, 1993, an operation that was supposed to arrest a Somali warlord developed into a gunfight that lasted for 16 hours and involved around one hundred and fifty Army Rangers and commanders going up against several hundred Somalis. On the crowded streets of Mogadishu, Somalis encircled United States Army Rangers and converted the situation into the worst combat in the history of UN peacekeeping deployments. Nineteen United States troops were killed, seventy were injured, and one helicopter pilot prisoned ("Empowering the United Nations," 1993). The President questioned his advisors and said, "How could anything like this happen?" (Boyd, et al. 1995). After seeing the horrific scene of Somali masses vandalizing the body of a US soldier on the roads of the city of Mogadishu, the US community once again questioned how a "humanitarian" campaign could be ruined in a race between Somalis and those who were sent to help. This question was prompted by the fact that the US community had witnessed the horrific scene. The cost of living in and shedding blood in this dangerous place, where the interests of a less powerful nation are at risk, far exceeds what the society in the United States was willing to pay for it. Many members of Congress advocated for the withdrawal of American forces, and some even called for the resignation of both the Secretary-General and the Secretary of Defense (Brison, 1994).

As a direct response to the anger caused by public and political violence during the most difficult days of withdrawal in Mogadishu, President Clinton established a deadline by which the participation of the American people in the United Nations' effort to form a nation in Somalia would come to an end. Contrary to what UN authorities believed, he came seeking the newly arrived leader General Mohammad Aideed, bringing the bloodthirsty Ranger army with him. On March 31, 1994, he ordered the whole United States force to depart Somalia (Christman, 1996). After the United States left, a number of other allies quickly followed suit. On March 31, 1995, the United Nations decided to withdraw from Somalia and dissolved UNOSOM II due to their inability to maintain control over Mogadishu amid the prevailing security situation. When the civil war in Somalia broke out in 1992, the country's fate was still in its citizens' hands. The riots on the 3rd of October provoked additional political violence; President Clinton's policy was to support forming a United Nations

peacekeeping force capable of international involvement with the assistance of American employees (Clark, 1993). Criticism of the United States' involvement in the Somali issue showed a growing dissatisfaction with the responsibilities of international peacekeeping and led to a major overhaul of the United States' expected participation in the United Nations authorizing international peacekeeping efforts. This dissatisfaction was shown by the criticism of the United States' involvement in the Somali issue.

The Republicans in Congress promptly launched a campaign to restrict the President's authority to deploy American forces overseas and prevent those troops from being subject to the laws of the nations in which they are deployed. (Clark, Walter and Robert, 1996). To come back to the larger agenda, the officials at the White House disguised the PDD 13, which was their developing plan to get the full armed forces in the United States to authorize the most crucial means to adopt a UN peacekeeping operation. This was done in order to protect national security. (Crigler, 1993). The findings of that review were included into the following issue of PDD-25, which was published in May 1994 and titled Clinton's Administrative Policy for the Transformation of Peace. That file signaled that President Clinton would be changing his policies and putting a stop to the "most powerful leadership" that had developed at the start of his management. It produced stringent new rules on when and how to deploy US forces abroad to meet the need for "highly focused alternatives" and "dynamic analysis of requirements." These were designed to address the need for "highly targeted options" and "dynamic analysis of needs." (Crocker, et al. 1995).

The UN was forced to start again in many respects as a result of its failure in Somalia. Former United States President John F. Kennedy is credited with making the following observation: "In Washington, a successful policy has a thousand parents, while a bad policy is an orphan." Willie Curtis's work was published in 1994. Due to the fact the well-planned strategy to capture the vicious warrior known as General Aided called for a surprise attack that resulted in the deaths of 23 Pakistani soldiers and was supported by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations and the Mogadishu offensive. However, the fatalities of the "unacceptable" ranger action were tortured in

pursuit of a UN operation, and the mere fact that this occurred represented a challenge to the newly developed policy of the President. (Dallachie, & Charles 1995).

4.2 Analyzing the challenges of AMISOM

In this section the researcher will highlight some of the challenges that African mission in Somalia faced, which contributed the mission not to become fully successful.

Lack of International support: It was overshadowed by international skepticism in the early years of AMISOM deployment, which resulted in a lack of adequate support for the operation. Only Uganda and Ethiopia have committed soldiers to Somalia before 2012. There has been a consistent failure to deploy the required number of soldiers. It was militarily and ethically untenable to be deploy a large number of troops and other basic equipment required for the mission's success. The morale of AMISOM troops was severely harmed as a result. AMISOM was left to carry out hugely risky missions without the support of effective enablers such as resource management, mission analysis, and air assets like drones, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters (Bruton and Williams 2013).

Weakness of AU political leadership: AMISOM external players frequently have competing interests and a lack of support for the mission. There have always been conflicts of interest between the countries that provide mission soldiers. AMISOM is facing a significant challenge from weak political leadership, including the AU chairperson, the AU Commission chairperson, and the PSC chairperson. Because the mission's headquarters are in Nairobi rather than Somalia, successive force commanders have had to compete for the role of principal political intermediary between the TFG and the AU. This also implies that the mission's troop-contributing countries have a high degree of autonomy, which has resulted in negative results (ibid).

Humanitarian crises and exploitation: During its first phase, AMISOM did not include a specific human rights component in accordance with international peacekeeping standards. The international community concentrated primarily on assisting the TFG, defending only UN and AU sites, equipment, and troops, and limiting Al- Shabaab's control capabilities, resulting in the international community's

long-term disregard of Somalia's civilian population. For example, in the first four months after AMISOM was deployed, 1/3 of Mogadishu's innocent civilian population fled the city due to terrible bloodshed caused by AMISOM-Al-Shabaab clashes. The operation was not given a specific mandate to protect people and could only use force in self-defense. Furthermore, the violence exacerbated the humanitarian catastrophe, exacerbated by reports of TFG officials restricting humanitarian supplies. Though there has been a greater focus on the security of Somalia's civilian population, AMISOM still has to bridge several holes in order to be viewed as trustworthy and legitimate by Somalis (Neus 2013). The civilian population of Somalia continues to be subjected to significant human rights breaches, according to the Human Rights World Report (2014). For grave violations of Somalia civilians, all parties to the lengthy battle were held guilty. Indiscriminate attacks, wrongful arrest and imprisonment, and sexual abuse are all examples of violations. Al-Shabaab has intensified its attacks on civilians.

Despite promises to safeguard civilians in Somalia, AMISOM has broken those promises. For example, a lady who claimed an AMISOM soldier raped her was arrested and convicted of degrading the state institution, together with the journalist who interviewed her (Lotze & Kasumaba, 2012).

When AMIOSM forces cause injury to civilians, they are shielded from disciplinary action and punishment. AMISOM hasn't formed a disciplinary policy, and there's no mechanism to improve disciplinary procedures against AMISOM personnel. This practically means that disciplinary issues are left to the discretion of the mission's leader (ibid).

Resources Limitations: AMISOM's resource constraints and capacity deficit relating to its statutory responsibilities are a severe problem. These resource limits manifested themselves in a variety of ways. The number of troops on the ground and the authorized number are vastly different. The number of soldiers required for a stable operation in Somalia in less hostile zones is between 5 and 10 troops per 1,000 people, while the demand in hostile regions is 20 troops per 1,000 people. The overall

population of Somalia is believed to be around 9 million people, implying approximately 100,000 intervention soldiers are necessary to deal with the country's different security issues. African troop-contributing countries have been hesitant to provide soldiers to AMISOM. The present number of soldiers on the ground is insufficient to carry out the mission's mandate. Due to a lack of personnel, the effort has been limited to a few districts of Mogadishu (Kromah 2010). The mission's current soldier strength is 22,126, which is insufficient for the operation to operate in all parts of Somalia. As a result, AMISOM's presence in Mogadishu has been confined to important vital sectors like the harbor, airport, government house, and mission posts (Boon 2012).

A scarcity of military equipment and supplies is another issue connected to resource restrictions. The international world has been slow to respond to AMISOM's requests for assault helicopters and transports. The shortage of equipment, notably aviation assets, prohibits AMISOM from conducting offensive operations, limiting the mission's efficacy. AMISOM troops would be moved more effectively and safely with this type of supplies (Tres, 2014).

The AU mission in Somalia also faces budgetary challenges for troop wages and reimbursements for state-owned equipment. This includes a lack of support for troop enablers and multipliers. The mission's operation has been harmed as a result of the inadequacies. AMISOM is overburdened to the point that it is unable to expand its military operations into other areas. The consequences of this scenario are extremely dangerous for the region's overall peace and security. (Australian Universities 2013a). In addition, AMISOM's efficiency is harmed by insufficient recompense for personnel who died or were injured. Even though troops are instructed to combat, there may come a time when they reject. Additionally, the troops are forced to sell or abandon their equipment due to a lack of pay (Kiyonga, 2015).

Internal Coherence and Coordination: Because of the varied nature of the AU mission, there was a lack of internal coherence and coordination. The key components of the mission are divided geographically. The mission's political affairs and strategic

planning section, for example, was situated in Addis Ababa, while the mission's operational and military element was stationed in Mogadishu, and the mission's headquarters was in Nairobi. The fact that many AMISOM training instruments for Somalia's stability were scattered throughout Djibouti, Uganda, and Ethiopia didn't help. Internal cohesion and coordination are harmed by this separate mission structure, particularly when it comes to tactical and operational difficulties.

The way the leader of the AMISOM mission was handled jeopardized Somalia's chances for peace and reconciliation (Paul 2013). The fact that AMISOM's headquarters were in Nairobi until the end of 2012 sent a negative political message to Somalis and outsiders. The AMISOM commanders were allowed to act as the mission's top political representatives. The mission's ability to fulfill its mandate has been hampered by the fact that civilian workers regularly travel from Nairobi to Mogadishu to carry out their responsibilities over lengthy periods. The frequent shuttle between Nairobi and Kenya has a significant logistical, financial, and psychological impact on the mission's performance. For example, whenever civilian people wish to leave the protected zone, they must be escorted by military escorts, which reduces the military component's limited resources (Kromah 2010).

The second facet of AMISOM's coordination challenge is a lack of cooperation between patrol teams within the task force, which is particularly problematic given the difficulty of patrolling the high-risk zone. Like no other state in the Horn of Africa, the mission cannot prosecute or even imprison everyone accused of piracy. Because of the lack of clear authority and security in Somalia's waters, there have been multiple incidents of piracy (Block et al., 2012). Al-Shabaab's (The Youth) Nature: challenging nature poses a severe threat to AMISOM. The group was founded in 2003 with the primary goal of irredentism and the creation of a larger Somalia (Dagne 2011). This terrorist group, nearly decimated by Ethiopian soldiers in 2007, is now a strong player in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. The key mechanisms for this group's strength are divisive regional and western policies, such as whether AMISOM would be changed into UNPO, which was rejected by UN member states unwilling to deploy their troops to the operation, and whether or not to engage in negotiation with Al-Shabaab

(Marchal 2011). Second is the illegality of its Somali rivals. Consider Ethiopia's and Somalia's unilateral interventions. The third is the ability to use ideological and economic resources to organize the organization. Funds are raised mostly from hijacking, piracy, and individual state and diaspora assistance. The organization has been able to pay the wages of its members (ibid). Furthermore, Al- Shabaab's power is bolstered by the progress of information and communication technology (ICT), which allows the group to communicate and enlist the help of worldwide terrorist networks (Wise 2011).

Al-Shabaab's military wing comprises both native and international militants, and the fact that this group is made up of disparate segments poses a significant obstacle to AMISOM since it is impossible to define and focus on a certain gravity scenario. The fighters in the organization are a cross between a local guerrilla army and a foreign-oriented Al-Qaeda terrorist outfit. As a result, AMISOM has a tough time determining who is an Al-Shabaab member (ibid). Military techniques used by Al-Shabaab, including hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, suicide bombers, and ambushes, pose a severe threat to AMISOM. Furthermore, AMISOM faces a significant obstacle in drawing the battle line due to Al-temporary Shabaab's collaboration with Somalia's state military forces. The organization teamed up with Somalia's national armed forces to battle Kenyan soldiers. Arms given to the Somali government were allegedly diverted to Al-Shabaab, implying a high level of corruption and collaboration between the organization and the Somali government (Sheeham, & Porter, 2014). AMISOM saw a lack of confidence among the TFG forces, who were unorganized, disorderly, and under-motivated. TFG soldiers and police carried out unlawful plundering and obstructions. They were providing Al-Shabaab with intelligence regarding AMISOM's activities. TFG personnel were involved in a number of criminal activities, including luring AMISOM soldiers into an ambush. All of these provided a severe obstacle to AMISOM and harmed the mission's results (Paul 2013).

The Conflict of Legitimate Government: Finding the legitimate authority in Somalia has been a major obstacle to peace and reconciliation at every stage of the conflict. Indeed, Somalia's efforts to stabilize have been hampered by the lack of a recognized

administration (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 2000). Furthermore, Somalia's government is characterized by a violent, fractured, and diverse hybrid form of formal and informal institutions overseen by clan militias, with conflict for Mogadishu's seat of authority (Tim 2005). Access to power and resources, are the clan's primary motivators, has proven to be a considerable barrier for AMISOM. Above and beyond clannism, there are disagreements on the country's desirability and nature. Many Somalis have been distrustful and nomadic of the central government's meddling in local affairs, a perception reinforced by Barre's rule. The major clans advocate a federal government in which the various parts of the state are independent, enabling sovereignty over a specific region of the state (Frazer 2012). As a result, the efficacy of AMISOM is contingent on the central government's ability to command legitimacy among Somalis. This may be demonstrated, for example, by assuring the efficient and timely supply of products and services and the security of freed areas.

Clan militia rivalry as a result of the legitimacy dispute. Clan rivalry has been a major impediment to AMISOM's ability to stabilize Somalia. Apart from AU forces, the majority of the Somalia National Army is made up of coalition clan militias that are solely unified by their hatred for Al-Shabaab. There have been instances of government forces attacking each other. Because of the considerable clan militia tensions in Somalia, it has been extremely difficult for all clans to come together under one tent and give adequate help to AMISOM. Clan rivalry has seriously threatened AMISOM's ability to deploy soldiers outside of Mogadishu (Tres, 2014).

Consent of the Warring Parties: Obtaining the consent of all parties participating in the Somalia war is also a difficulty for AMISOM. Because UNPO deployment necessitates the approval of all

parties concerned; it is also essential in regional peacekeeping missions. All of Somalia's fighting parties have refused to cooperate with AMISOM. Although AMISOM has the TFG's approval, it is apparent that the Islamist militants oppose the deployment of foreign forces. As a result, AMISOM's ability to fulfill its mandate is hampered (Halane, 2012).

4.3. Analyzing the motives of TCC to join AMISOM

4.3.1 Kenya's Involvement in Somalia

Kenya borders Somalia and is a home for large numbers of Somali refugees. Kenya's Northeastern region is also inhabited by Somalis. Kenya had maintained a policy of nonintervention in the armed conflict in Somalia for almost two decades. Instead of militarily intervening in the Somali conflict, Kenya has established itself as the region's economic and political hub (Eriksson 2013). However, this does not imply that Kenya and Somalia have been completely trouble-free. Between 1963 to 1967, Kenya and Somalia were immersed in a border dispute in which the Somalis of northeastern Kenya tried to separate from Kenya (Miyandazi 2012).

As a result of the growing intensity of the Somalia conflict, the threats it poses to Kenya have increased. Numerous Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory have impacted national security and the profitable tourism industry in the largest economy in East Africa (Maito et al, 2013). Al-Shabaab-affiliated killings and bombings have occurred incessantly in the northeastern area of Kenya, which has been affected by the spread of instability from Somalia (Eriksson 2013).

As a result, Al-Shabaab began recruiting Kenyan teenagers and other Kenyan Muslims into their terrorist organization. The Kenyan government viewed this as a significant danger to its national security and interests. Recruitment of Kenyan youths might give Al-Shabaab with the capability to destabilize Kenya using local militants. As a result, the government of Kenya decided to change its approach in the Somalia Conflict by introducing a unilateral military intervention in Somalia known as Operation Linda Nchi or protect the nation. In 2011, the government of Kenya sent the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) to Somalia in order to strike Al-Shabaab and preserve their attacks against Kenya (International Crisis Group, 2012). According to Miyandazi (2012), the fact that Kenya sent its troops into Somalia is evidence that nations become involved in a war when the protection of their national interests is at stake. The purpose of Kenya's engagement in Somalia was to try to protect its territory against invasion from other forces (ibid).

In a similar manner, Eriksson (2013) explains that Kenya's intervention in the Somalia conflict was guided by national interest concerning its borders security, the threat that Al-Shabaab posed to Kenya's tourism sector, Kenya's political interest in supporting the newly established Somalia government, and Kenya's pursuit to play an active regional role.

The Somalia conflict posed serious security challenge to Kenya. The kidnappings and attacks on tourists and humanitarian workers by Al-Shabaab in Kenya have become an increasingly major problem for the country's tourism and business industries. The pirates from Somalia caused a variety of problems which had repercussions on Kenya's economy and society. Pirates from Somalia have also attacked and taken hostages ships carrying tourists and cargos on their way to Kenya through Somali waters. In this context, as to safeguard its own national interest, Kenya seeks for peace and security in Somalia (Yussuf 2014). According to Warner (2012), Kenya's involvement in the Somalia Crisis was intended to earn voter support for the 2013 election in Kenya. In addition, in light of Uganda and Ethiopia's efforts to stabilize the Somalia conflict, Kenya has opted to demonstrate to the international community that it is competent and ready to deploy military force to address a key regional security concern.

Despite Kenya's military intervention in Somalia and participation in the war against Al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization remains extremely active and poses danger to Kenya's national security (Menkhaus 2012). Al-Shabaab operates freely within and outside of Kenya, the entry of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) into Somalia has resulted in an increase in the number of civilian deaths in Kenya as a result of retaliation assaults from Al-Shabaab (Maito et al, 2013). The tourist business in Kenya was put in jeopardy once again as Al-Shabaab launched a fresh wave of attacks along the country's coastline, which caused widespread fear in the sector. On July 5, 2014, a terrorist Al-Shabaab attacked a Kenyan town on the island of Lamu, resulting in the deaths of 15 people. and next day, on July 6, they also attacked Mpeketonia and murdered 49 people (Manson, 2014). Additionally, Manson (2015) states that despite Kenya's military incursion in Somalia, Al-Shabaab is still poses treat to Kenya. On April 2, 2015, the terrorist organization laid siege to Garissa University in Kenya,

firing gunshots and throwing grenades. Since the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi by Al-Qaeda in 1998 and the terror attack on Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi by Al-Shabaab in 2013, which killed 67 Kenyans and tourists in a hostage situation that captured global horror, the attack on Garissa University was the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya. Following Kenya's unilateral intervention in Somalia, the country was eventually forced to include the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) into AMISOM. This was due to the fact that Kenya's unclear goals were considered to be counterproductive by the parties in the Somalia conflict, and also Kenya is unable to act alone financially. Kenya's involvement in Somalia is not intended to provide support for Somalia's centralized government, rather its strategy was to create a semi-autonomous state that can serve as a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia's border and that will be governed by a friendly Somalia group. The purpose of the buffer zone, which is commonly referred to as Jubbaland, was to prevent al-Shabaab from entering Kenyan territory. (Pijovic 2013).

The fact is that Kenya's involvement in Somalia is indication that the state is willing to contribute to peacekeeping missions to safeguard its own national interests. The establishment of a Kenyan-controlled buffer state in the southern part of Somalia was one of Kenya's primary goals in getting involved in the conflict in Somalia. This was done in order for Kenya to better defend its own national interests. Another cause was the necessity to improve the level of security for business ties with Somalia (Hull 2013). Kenya pursues its own national interest despite its involvement in AMISOM. For instance, there was an obvious conflict with AMISOM when the KDF declined to fully communicate with the leadership of AMISOM. The Jubbaland region is the only that Kenyan forces are interested in, and they were active participants in the process of establishing regional autonomy in the Jubbaland region. In addition, the Federal Government of Somalia did offer its support to Kenya's plan to establish an independent Jubbaland, which is seen by the FGS as a potential step toward the further regionalization of Somalia. (Eriksson 2013).

4.3.2 Ethiopia’s Involvement in Somalia

The history of several political and territorial tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia in the past has been the root cause of the animosity which led to Ethiopia's involvement in the conflict of Somalia. This includes the boundary dispute that occurred between 1960 and 1964, the Ogaden war that occurred between 1977 and 1978, and the cross-border dispute that occurred between 1988 and 2000. (Sharamo and Mesfin 2011). While the conflicts between the two countries have not been officially settled through interstate processes, the Somali civil war began in 1991, and the context of the civil war posed a new security threat to Ethiopia as several Somali factions threatened to invade Ethiopia (Abbink 2003).

Ethiopia's involvement in the Somalia conflict extends over two decades. Since the fall of Siad Barre and the collapse of the Somalia government, Ethiopian forces have regularly interred in the Somalia conflict. Ethiopian forces interred Somalia for the first time in August 1996, and then again in March 1999. Ethiopian forces attacked Balanbelle town in Somalia border fighting Al-ltihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), an Islamist group that was fighting to reclaim and integrate the eastern Ogaden region of Ethiopia into Somalia (Sharamo et al 2011).

Ethiopia's engagement in the Somalia conflict was driven by its desire to keep its hegemonic leadership in the East African area and to demonstrate to the world community that it has greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the Horn of Africa (Lloy 2013). According to Muthuma (2007), the benefit that war in Somalia adds to Ethiopia's national interest is the primary reason for Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia. Ethiopia did not want to see a competent administration in Somalia that might begin the fight to regain the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Considering Ethiopia's difficult relationship with Eritrea, Ethiopia had an interest in disrupting and preventing any ties between her internal rebels, such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the state of Eritrea (Malito 2011). The stability and security of the Ethiopian federation

depended on the possibility of persuading the Somali population living in Ethiopia to give up their ambition to separate from Ethiopia (Markakis 1996). As a consequence of this, Ethiopia maintains good relationships with a number of influential warlords in Somalia and provides them with military help to fight Islamist extremists (Elimi and Barrise 2006). Considering the resolution of the Somalia conflict, Ethiopia has been the primary reason in its continuation. Ethiopia has interrupted the Somalia peace process and the newly constituted transnational government. Ethiopia has consistently supplied guns across the border and attacked southern Somalia on many occasions. Thus, Ethiopia, a well-positioned and powerful state, is an aggressive neighbor that seeks to keep Somalia divided and weak (ibid).

By the approval of UNSC under Resolution 2124 on the 22nd of January 2014, Ethiopian forces were officially integrated into the AMISOM, deploying around 4,000 troops to the African Union operation in Somalia. The withdrawal of its soldiers and reintegration into AMISOM appears to be motivated by economic factors, as they were not under AMISOM and must finance their own expenditures (Andreas 2013).

Due to Ethiopia's national interest in the Somalia conflict, Ethiopian soldiers within AMISOM have only operated in the southwest region of Somalia, and their geographical line of action has not changed (Yussuf 2014).

4.3.3 Uganda’s Involvement in Somalia

Since the establishment of AMISOM in February 2007, over 20,000 Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) and police officers have been sent to Somalia as part of AMISOM. To this day, Uganda is the state that contributes the most troops to the African Union mission in Somalia, making it the largest troop contributing state. It is well known that Uganda's involvement in the Somalia conflict was its national interests. In truth, economic and status interests have influenced Uganda's participation in the African Union mission in Somalia. Since the 1990s, western donors have contributed up to seventy percent of Uganda's national budget. Therefore, Uganda's participation in the Somalia war is a way to increase and maintain donor support. By

sending Ugandan troops to Somalia, Museveni's administration was able to persuade western donors to view him as an essential regional ally deserving of aid, instead of to a semi-authoritarian or corrupt regime. Additionally, it kept a large number of troops busy outside of Uganda. (Fisher 2012).

The second interpretation of Uganda's participation in AMISOM was that the Museveni had ambitious goals for his country. He wished for Uganda to be regarded as a superpower in the East African region, while his counterparts would regard him as a regional leader like to Nyere, Mandela, or Kofi Annan. Therefore, his participation in the AU operation in Somalia has enabled him to achieve this status (ibid, p. 8). Another reason was reviving the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF), which faced heavy criticism for its 1998-2003 operations in the Republic of Congo and South Sudan 2002-2003. AMISOM appears to be an opportunity to reestablish UPDF's image and, more importantly, to receive military training, funding, and equipment from the United States (Bruton and Williams 2014).

4.3.4 Burundi's Involvement in Somalia

Burundi is the second-most contributing country to the African Mission in Somalia. When Al-Shabaab killed more than 70 Burundian peacekeepers in Somalia in December 2011, it raised questions about why a small state in Central Africa would send 4,000 of its soldiers to fight in Somalia.

Burundi's decision to join AMISOM was driven mostly by its desire to improve its national and international prestige, to increase professionalism and coherence within a newly assembled army, and to gain financial benefits (Wilen, Nina, Ambrosetti, Birantamije. 2015). The primary objective of Burundi's deployment was to solidify and strengthen the newly-integrated BNDF as a crucial component of the country's post-civil war peace process. Senior Burundi official said that joining AMISOM was the country's way of expressing appreciation for the international aid it received to end its civil war and enhancing Burundi's reputation on the world stage, in part by raising the professionalism of its military.

In terms of military unity and professionalism, joining AMISOM gave previous enemies the opportunity to unite while fighting al-Shabaab behind the same lines (Charles, 2013). Due to a number of incentives, including professionalization, prestige, and financial prospects, Burundi's choice to join AMISOM temporarily stabilized the country's internal political balance (Wilen., et al, 2015).

The above analyses have depended on the realist interpretation to explain that participating AMISOM, and sending troops to Somalia were driven by national interest. These explanations show diversities of national interest concomitant to their engagement from military perspective, achieving of prestige, fostering leadership status, and economic interest.

The military participation of troop-contributing nations has been authorized by the Federal Government of Somalia. However, the decisions of these governments have sparked regional disagreement, therefore jeopardizing the country's long-term stability. The actions of these states in accordance with their national interests appears to be at against with the ultimate aim of stabilizing all of Somalia by establishing a strong federal administration. Even though there was unusually high chance of casualties in AMISOM, Economic reason was the most prominent issue counties participated the mission. This shows that having international funding was key in explaining why all troop contributing countries joined AMISOM, including Kenya and Ethiopia, which first launched unilateral interventions in Somalia mainly for security reasons.

However, the merits of joining AMISOM were not only material, particularly for Burundi and Sierra Leone, their AMISOM deployments were essential in professionalizing and building a new identity for their newly reassembled, post-civil war military. Politically, the decision to join AMISOM was also essential in building links with major external donors.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion And Recommendations

Following the collapse of the nation's centralized government, several initiatives were undertaken to end the fighting and bring the conflicting sides to the negotiating table. However, a significant number of those attempts at peacemaking were unsuccessful. Somali Federal government was established in Kenya with the hope it would bring a long-lasting solution to Somali problems. Many people had the expectation that the transitional federal administration would fortify the state's institutions, discover answers to problems with national security, and bring order back to the country. Unfortunately, the TFG did not alter much from the country and hence lost its effectiveness. The interim federal government was unable to preserve peace and stability, but more crucially, it could not meet the difficulties posed by the Islamic Courts Unions (ICU). Despite the fact that the Ethiopian military involvement diminished ICU's popularity, the organization remained committed to ensuring that the transitional federal government exercised power and established itself as the sole legal authority in the nation.

Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization, opposed to the Somali state, posed a significant problem for the African Union Mission in Support of Somalia (AMISOM) and caused it to confront multiple threats. Following the intervention by the Ethiopian government in 2007, AMISOM arrived in Somalia to support the country's embattled government. It was the African Union that extended a helping hand to Somalia and backed the task of peacekeepers working in the nation with the assistance of the United Nations. The research shows that, in general, the AMISOM mission is faced with more obstacles than opportunities, and, more crucially, it does not have the most effective approach to stabilize the country and get rid of militia organizations like Al-Shabaab.

At the moment, the most considerable difficulty that Somalia is dealing with is the question of security, in which Al-Shabaab poses a significant challenge to the Somali

state. In addition, the nation cannot regulate its borders and reduce the dangers posed by those within and those who come from beyond its borders.

This study explores the peacekeeping initiatives of the international and regional organizations to stabilize Somalia, with the main focus on African Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia. Based on realist perspective the researcher examined the role of national interest on the choices and the decision of the troop contributing countries to participate the mission. Also, the motives of the funding states. Accordingly, the study found that national interest such us economic (military aid), political (security threat), and social factors (prestige), are the motives of these states for their involvement in the mission, and doing so they have jeopardized the countries long lasting stability.

AMISOM's major international partners, including the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, the African Union, and the federal and regional Somali authorities, should make the formation of an inclusive, capable, and professional Somali security force a key priority. This is a necessity for reducing the danger posed by Al-Shabaab and allowing AMISOM to successfully withdraw from Somalia.

The AU must ensure that any allegations of wrongdoing by AMISOM soldiers are thoroughly investigated and that those responsible are held accountable. In this case, the accountability of the mission is very much needed in justifying the good behaviors that correct the effectiveness of the mission.

The UN, EU, and AU should prioritize the country's long-term stability by giving assistance to the Somali army. The United Nations should provide sufficient funds to the Somali National Army to close the pay gap between the local army and AMISOM personnel. The armies of countries that share territorial disputes with Somalia should be removed from the mission.

To develop the level of education and increase awareness that violence and conflict will only result backwardness. This will help people understand the importance of rule law. To have a state that can exercise the legitimate force within a society is something

that brings peace and stability. It is the recommendation of the study that youth in Somalia should be educated for them to have brighter future.

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